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Publié par
Date de parution
20 juillet 2016
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9781783718184
Langue
English
Publié par
Date de parution
20 juillet 2016
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9781783718184
Langue
English
The End of Jewish Modernity
The End of Jewish Modernity
Enzo Traverso
Translated by David Fernbach
First published in French as La fin de la modernité juive: Histoire d’un conservateur
by Editions La Découverte
English translation first published 2016 by Pluto Press
345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA
www.plutobooks.com
Copyright © Editions La Découverte, Paris, France, 2013;
English translation © David Fernbach, 2016
The right of Enzo Traverso to be identified as the author of this work and David Fernbach to be identified as the translator has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 0 7453 3661 9 Hardback
ISBN 978 0 7453 3666 4 Paperback
ISBN 978 1 7837 1817 7 PDF eBook
ISBN 978 1 7837 1819 1 Kindle eBook
ISBN 978 1 7837 1818 4 EPUB eBook
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental standards of the country of origin.
Typeset by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England
Simultaneously printed in the European Union and United States of America
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. What Was Jewish Modernity?
2. Cosmopolitanism, Mobility and Diaspora
3. Intellectuals Between Critique and Power
4. Between Two Epochs: Jewishness and Politics in Hannah Arendt
5. Metamorphoses: From Judeophobia to Islamophobia
6. Zionism: Return to the Ethnos
7. Memory: The Civil Religion of the Holocaust
Conclusion
Notes
Index
Acknowledgements
I’ve become aware in writing this book of my debt to many scholars, and would like to mention at least two of them here: Dan Diner, with whom every conversation is a source of enrichment and reflection, and Michael Löwy, who introduced and guided me through the study of Jewish history 30 years ago. He has become a friend and remains an indispensable interlocutor. I do not know how far either of them shares my hypotheses and interpretations, for which they of course bear no responsibility, but their help has been most valuable. The same holds also for Laurent Jeanpierre and Rémy Toulouse, who subjected my manuscript to a valuable critical reading. My thanks to you all.
Paris, Fall 2012
The English edition of this essay comes out three years after the original French. In the meanwhile, it has been translated into Italian and Spanish, and German and Turkish editions are forthcoming. As all scholars and public intellectuals know, an English translation is the necessary condition for reaching an international readership, and this is particularly true for a book devoted to Jewish history and culture in the twentieth century. Thus, I am very grateful to David Shulman for supporting this essay and allowing its release by Pluto Press, a publisher as scholarly rigorous as politically committed: a felicitous combination which I have always adopted as a model for myself. This English edition benefits greatly from the talents of David Fernbach, one the best translators working today, and I would like to thank him, too. In the countries where it already has been published, this book aroused controversies and criticism, was both enthusiastically received – including a prestigious award in Italy – and violently rejected. This is the destiny of all committed works, especially those that put into question commonplaces and contribute to destroying myths transformed into reasons of state. I hope this English edition will accomplish a similar role.
Ithaca, NY, February 2016.
Introduction
On 24 December 1917, Leon Trotsky, the newly appointed foreign minister of Soviet Russia, arrived at Brest-Litovsk for negotiations to be held with the Prussian empire in view of a separate peace. His delegation included a certain Karl Radek, Polish Jew and citizen of the Habsburg empire, wanted in Germany on account of his defeatist propaganda. As they got off the train, they began distributing leaflets to the enemy soldiers, calling for international revolution. The German diplomats observed them dumbfounded. 1 When they came to power, the Bolsheviks had made public the secret agreements between the tsarist regime and the Western powers; their aim was not to be accepted by international diplomacy but to denounce it. The state of mind of the German plenipotentiaries in the face of their Soviet counterparts is hard to comprehend today; we would have to imagine the arrival of an Al-Qaeda delegation at a G8 summit. Jews at this time were identified with Bolshevism, that is, a worldwide conspiracy against civilization. A bellicose conservative such as Winston Churchill saw them as ‘enemies of the human race’, representatives of an ‘animal barbarism’. Civilization, he wrote, ‘is being completely extinguished over gigantic areas, while the Bolsheviks hop and caper like troops of ferocious baboons amid the ruins of cities.’ They destroyed everything in their path, ‘like vampires sucking the blood of their victims’. Carried away by his eloquence, Churchill did not flinch from attributing Jewish traits to Lenin; this ‘monster standing on a pyramid of skulls’ was simply the leader of ‘a vile group of cosmopolitan fanatics’. 2
The wave of anti-Semitism triggered by the Russian Revolution did not stop short at Western diplomats. John Maynard Keynes, a member of the British delegation at the Versailles conference of 1919, described in striking terms the contempt that Lloyd George displayed towards Louis-Lucien Klotz, minister of finance in the Clemenceau government, who was particularly intransigent on the question of German reparations. Klotz, wrote Keynes, was ‘a short, plump, heavy-moustached Jew, well groomed, well kept, but with an unsteady, roving eye’. In a fit of sudden and uncontrolled hatred, Lloyd George ‘leant forward and with a gesture of his hands he indicated to everyone the image of a hideous Jew clutching a money-bag. His eyes flashed and the words came out with a contempt so violent that he seemed almost to be spitting at him. The anti-Semitism, not far below the surface in such an assemblage as that one, was up in the heart of everyone.’ When the British prime minister called on his French opposite number to put an end to the obstructionist tactics of his finance minister, who, by his intransigence, risked playing the game of European Bolshevism alongside Lenin and Trotsky, ‘All around the room you could see each one grinning and whispering to his neighbour “Klotzky”.’ 3
Let us now jump forward half a century. On 27 January 1973, again in Paris, the representatives of the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam signed a peace treaty at the end of another famous conference. The American plenipotentiary was Henry Kissinger, a German Jew who had emigrated in 1938, at the age of fifteen, to escape Nazi persecution. In this conference, however, the roles had changed. Kissinger did not represent revolution, but counter-revolution. It was he who, following his elevation to the State Department under President Nixon, had ordered the military escalation in Vietnam and Cambodia. Anti-war demonstrators across the world identified Kissinger with bombing and napalm. A few months after the Paris conference, Kissinger gave the green light to General Pinochet’s putsch in Chile. The Nobel Peace laureate could boast of having organized several wars during his term at the State Department, some horrifically murderous, from Bangladesh to Vietnam, East Timor to the Middle East, as well as coups d’état from Chile to Argentina. 4 The hatred he aroused, deep as it was, had nothing in common with anti-Semitism, but rather with the rejection of what was now called imperialism.
Imperialism, indeed, was for Kissinger a kind of vocation. From the time of his studies at Harvard he identified with Metternich, the architect of restoration at the Vienna Congress of 1814, and above all with Bismarck, the builder of German unity, a statesman who saw international relations not in terms of abstract principles but rather of the balance of forces and Realpolitik . After the model of Bismarck, who had succeeded in 1871 in imposing Prussian hegemony in Europe by upsetting the balance of the concert of Europe, he saw himself as strategist of American hegemony in the world of the Cold War. Aware that power required self-restraint, Bismarck had been a ‘white revolutionary’, that is, a counter-revolutionary, capable of challenging the international order ‘in conservative garb’. 5 In the wake of Bismarck, Kissinger sought to be the embodiment of Machtpolitik in the second half of the twentieth century.
Trotsky and Kissinger: archetypes of the Jew as revolutionary and the Jew as imperialist. It is true that this opposition might need a certain qualification. On the one hand, a conservative Jewish diplomacy had already appeared in the nineteenth century, particularly in Great Britain and in France under the Third Republic, where the Alliance Israélite Universelle had a certain influence. On the other hand, there were still many Jewish revolutionaries in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly in France. The fact remains that Trotsky and Kissinger embody, beyond the chronological distance that divides them, two opposite paradigms of Jewishness. The first left its mark on the interwar years, the second on the years of the Cold War. This book sets out to study this change: its roots, its forms and its outcome.
Today, the axis of the Jewish world has shifted from Europe to the United States and Israel. Anti-Semitism no longer shapes national cultures, having given way to Islamophobia, the dominant form of racism in the early twenty-first century, as well as a new Judeophobia generated by the Israel-Palestine conflict. The memory of the Holocaust, transformed into a ‘