Summary of James Hoopes's Peirce on Signs , livre ebook

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44 pages

English

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Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 We can discuss anything if we can define it. We can define anything we can understand. We can give intelligible definitions of many things that cannot be comprehended in and of themselves.

Sujets

Philosophie

Épistémologie

Epistémologie

Philosophie et théologie

Philosophy

Logic

Informations

Publié par	Everest Media LLC
Date de parution	26 mai 2022
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9798822522596
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0150€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

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Insights on James Hoopes's Peirce on Signs
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12 Insights from Chapter 13 Insights from Chapter 14 Insights from Chapter 15 Insights from Chapter 16 Insights from Chapter 17 Insights from Chapter 18 Insights from Chapter 19 Insights from Chapter 20 Insights from Chapter 21
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

We can discuss anything if we can define it. We can define anything we can understand. We can give intelligible definitions of many things that cannot be comprehended in and of themselves.
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

If the mind immediately perceives ideas but those ideas are not representative of things without, then the truth of those representative ideas is in doubt. Immanuel Kant had addressed this issue in his Critic of Pure Reason.

#2

The Transcendentalists believe that all knowledge is an inference from sensual minor premisses. They then go on to test all our Conceptions as to objective validity by finding whether they are anything but particular expressions of the I think or of sensuousness.

#3

Kant believed in the validity of the Ideas of pure reason, but he did not believe in faith. He believed that nothing that rests only on inference can be certain. Thus, he left room for the possibility of proving the opposite which would establish the validity of faith.

#4

The argument has the following advantages. It puts faith on the same ground as all certitude. It does not make it so sure that it is no longer faith. It explains how we were already sure before we had reasoned about faith.

#5

Faith is not a purely intellectual principle. It is an unaccountable impulse to confide in certain truths. It is the recognition by consciousness of itself.

#6

The Nature of Metaphysics is the analysis of Conceptions. In our investigations, metaphysics is to be taken as the analysis of Conceptions. We must ask the critical question: How should the conceptions that spring up freely in our minds be true for the outward world.

#7

Truth is the agreement of a representation with its object. Truth is partial when it is only partially true. Verisimilitude is partial truth. falsehood is a representation that is not a copy of truth, and is therefore not true.
Insights from Chapter 3

#1

Peirce’s list of the fundamental categories of thought is the gift he makes to the world. He remains loyal to this paper’s typology of representamens: likeness, index, and symbol.

#2

The theory that the function of conceptions is to reduce the manifold of sensuous impressions to unity is based on the fact that the validity of a conception depends on the impossibility of reducing the content of consciousness to unity without the introduction of it.

#3

The terms prescision and abstraction are now limited to mental separation that arises from attention to one element and neglect of the other. Abstraction or prescision is not a reciprocal process. It is frequently the case that while A cannot be prescinded from B, B can be prescinded from A.

#4

The first universal elementary conception is that of being, which is the union of a term to express the substance and another to express the quality of that substance. The function of the conception of being is to unite the quality to the substance.

#5

The fact that we can know a quality only through its contrast or similarity to another is a result of introspection. The application of a mediate conception to a more immediate one is untrustworthy. To be asserted, the more mediate conception must be considered independently of this circumstance.

#6

Every comparison requires a ground, a correlate, and an interpretant. The interpretant is the mediating representation that represents the relate as being a representation of the same correlate that the interpretant itself is.

#7

The five categories are being, quality, relation, representation, and substance. The three intermediate categories are called accidents. The passage from the many to the one is numerical. The five categories are derived from the five objects of thought, and they serve as a list of supposable objects.

#8

There are three types of representations: likenesses, indices, and symbols. The objects of the understanding, considered as representations, are symbols, which are signs that are at least potentially general. The rules of logic apply to all symbols.

#9

There would be a general division of symbols, common to all these sciences, into those that directly determine their grounds or imputed qualities and those that independently determine their objects by means of other terms.

#10

In an argument, the premises form a representation of the conclusion because they indicate the interpretant of the argument, or representation representing it to represent its object. The premises may provide a likeness, index, or symbol of the conclusion.

#11

The first premise states that S′, S″, S′″, and Siv is an index of M. The other divisions of terms, propositions, and arguments arise from the distinction of extension and comprehension.

#12

According to Herbart, our thoughts may be considered from two perspectives: as activities of our mind, and in relation to what is thought through them. In the latter respect, they are called concepts.
Insights from Chapter 4

#1

The Cognition Series is a set of essays in which Peirce attempts to explain how thought works. In the first essay, he states that human beings are signs that require an interpretant to give them meaning. The sense of self, the individual’s awareness of being distinct from the rest of the universe, is not an immediately known idea but an inference.

#2

Intuition is a cognition not determined by a previous cognition of the same object, and therefore not determined by something out of the consciousness. It is clear that we have this ability, as we seem to feel that we do. But the weight of that testimony depends on our being assumed to have the ability to distinguish in this feeling whether the feeling is the result of education, old associations, etc. , or an intuitive cognition.

#3

The power of intuitively distinguishing intuitions from other cognitions has not prevented men from arguing very passionately about which cognitions are intuitive. The credibility of authority is still debated today, and many people doubt the authority of their own intuition.

#4

The blind spot on the retina is a clear example of how we cannot distinguish intellectual results from intuitional data by simple contemplation. We must compare the sensations of one instant with those of another to distinguish textures of cloth.

#5

The pitch of a tone depends on the rapidity with which impressions are conveyed to the mind. These impressions must exist before any tone is produced, and so the sensation of pitch is determined by previous cognitions.

#6

The perception of two dimensions of space is an immediate intuition. But if we were to see immediately an extended surface, our retinas would be spread out in an extended surface. Instead of that, the retina consists of innumerable needles pointing towards the light, and whose distances from one another are decidedly greater than the minimum visible.

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Summary of James Hoopes's Peirce on Signs , livre ebook

Philosophie

Épistémologie

Epistémologie

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Philosophie et théologie

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