Summary of Sean Naylor's Not a Good Day to Die , livre ebook

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66 pages

English

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Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 There were many different groups and individuals involved in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda, from the American generals to the Afghan soldiers who fought on the Americans’ side.
#2 The author would like to thank Captain Nathan Self, the commander of A Company, 1st Ranger Battalion, for his time and assistance.

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History

General

Military

General officer

Histoire

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Publié par	Everest Media LLC
Date de parution	12 juin 2022
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9798822509276
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0150€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

Extrait

Insights on Sean Naylor's Not a Good Day to Die
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8
Insights from Chapter 1
Insights from Chapter 2

#1

There were many different groups and individuals involved in the planning and execution of Operation Anaconda, from the American generals to the Afghan soldiers who fought on the Americans’ side.

#2

The author would like to thank Captain Nathan Self, the commander of A Company, 1st Ranger Battalion, for his time and assistance.
Insights from Chapter 3

#1

The AC-130 gunship used by Special Operations Command and based on the C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. The H-model is called the Spectre. The newer U-model is called the Spooky.

#2

The Special Forces are the Army’s unconventional warfare troops. They are not to be confused with the special operations forces, which are under the command of Special Operations Command.

#3

The code name given to Operational Detachment Alpha 594, the Special Forces A-team led by Captain Glenn Thomas. They were tasked with capturing or killing Fidel Castro.
Insights from Chapter 4

#1

The first light of dawn was just beginning to touch the mountains as the three helicopters flew between them. The noise of the engines made conversation impossible, and most of the soldiers were shielded from the cold air by blankets.

#2

The Chinook troops were part of the 101st Airborne Division, and their predecessors had slumbered in the same manner in the transports that flew across the English Channel in the early hours of June 6, 1944, or when Black Hawk helicopters ferried them into battle in the 1991 Gulf War.

#3

The first Chinook helicopter was used to transport the troops to the battlefront. It was a risky mission, as the helicopters were flying through a 100-foot gap between a bank of fog beneath them and a layer of cloud above. But the skies began to clear, and the helicopters made it to the release point.

#4

As the Chinooks neared the LZ, they were warned that a litter urgent casualty required evacuation by helicopter ASAP. The ground troops weren’t even on the ground yet, and a friendly soldier’s life was already ebbing away.

#5

There were at least thirteen fighters hidden in the crags and crevices up ahead who knew the Chinooks were coming. But they were all American soldiers, members of the most elite units. They had already saved the operation from catastrophe once.

#6

When the helicopter landed, the soldiers rose as one. They were relieved to be on the ground, where they could regain some control over their fates. Impatient to get out, Sergeant Scotty Mendenhall stepped onto the ramp while it was still descending.
Insights from Chapter 5

#1

The Ariana Hotel in Kabul was used by the American CIA as their headquarters in Afghanistan. The guards outside were tough-looking Northern Alliance fighters, hard men down from the Panjshir Valley who had been fighting for more than 20 years.

#2

The Americans had believed they had Al Qaida’s leaders holed up at Tora Bora in the White Mountains, but this time their faith in their militia allies was misplaced. The Americans knew they could not rest until those guerrillas were captured.

#3

The CIA was getting a lot of reports that Al Qaida forces were regrouping in a mountainous region south of Gardez in eastern Afghanistan’s rugged Paktia province. Blaber wrote the name down in his day planner.

#4

The Americans at the Ariana Hotel in Kabul were not the only ones interested in the Shahikot Valley. Two weeks earlier, two Army officers had been poring over maps of eastern Afghanistan, and planning to airdrop a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division to take control of Kabul’s airport.

#5

When the Taliban fled Kabul in late 2001, they headed to their stronghold in Kandahar, where their resistance evaporated by December 9. Meanwhile, bin Laden and hundreds of his fighters fled to their Tora Bora stronghold.

#6

The Mountain headquarters planed an operation to crush Al Qaida guerrillas in the Shahikot valley. They had no access to the most up-to-date intelligence about events in Afghanistan, as it was compartmentalized.

#7

Within 48 hours of returning to K2 from meeting with Mikolashek, Hagenbeck was finally briefed on some of the compartmentalized intelligence he had been missing. The man sharing the intel was Colonel John Mulholland, a bear of a man who commanded 5th Special Forces Group.

#8

The key to understanding and implementing UW doctrine in Afghanistan was to reduce it to its simplest form. The three questions that must be answered in order for a potential G-chief to do business with the Americans are: Do we have a common goal today. Do we have a secure backyard. Are you willing to kill somebody.

#9

American interests diverged from those of the Northern Alliance. The Americans wanted to capture or kill the hundreds of Al Qaida fighters now on the run in eastern Afghanistan, as well as Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar and his immediate subordinates.

#10

The Americans went with the modus operandi that had worked for them up to now: unconventional warfare. They found a few local militia leaders they thought they could work with in the Tora Bora area, and used them to hunt down bin Laden.

#11

The United States did not want to make the same mistakes as the Russians, and did not want to look like an invading force. This was a simplistic view of the Soviets’ defeat in Afghanistan, which owed as much to their attempt to impose an alien, morally bankrupt political system on the Afghan population using scorched-earth tactics as it did to the raw number of troops they put into the country.

#12

Within the Pentagon, the Army leaders argued for a greater deployment of regular Army units to Afghanistan. They were constantly being rebuffed by the defense secretary and his political appointees.

#13

The attack on the Tora Bora base began November 30, and just like previous operations, it was a Afghan militia led by a warlord named Hazrat Ali who carried it out. But this time, the Al Qaida fighters fought to the death to protect their leaders, who escaped into Pakistan.

#14

The American surveillance planes spotted scores of intense heat sources in the snowy heights. The generals in Kuwait recommended bombing the positions, but the higher headquarters refused because they couldn’t prove that the fires were being kept warm by shepherds.

#15

Mark Rosengard was the operations officer for the K2 mission. He was a exuberant self-confidence who had experience operating in Bosnia, Kosovo, and northern Iraq. He was well-respected by his subordinates.

#16

As Dagger’s leaders figured out where to focus their energies next, they began to rethink their all UW, all the time approach. The war had changed course, and they were now facing a different enemy than they had encountered and conquered using unconventional warfare.

#17

By mid-December, reports were coming back from eastern Afghanistan about Al Qaida activity in the Shahikot area. The focus on Paktia sent Dagger personnel searching for copies of two books that had been sent to them before they left 5th Group’s home post of Fort Campbell: The Bear Went Over the Mountain and The Other Side of the Mountain.

#18

As the Dagger teams continued to gather information on the Al Qaida forces south of Gardez, one officer took a more scientific approach and began painting a picture of the network of safe houses, transportation nodes, and escape routes out of Afghanistan that the militants used.

#19

The American-backed Zia Lodin commanded a Pushtun militia group in Logar province, south of Kabul. He seemed to be a rare type of Afghan strongman, and was quickly befriended by the Americans.

#20

The town of Gardez had a feel of past grandeur gone to seed. Its population was booming, and its barely paved roads were choked with people. The Americans moved into a compound there, and their Afghan allies camped outside.

#21

The CIA set about trying to develop sources in Gardez, while the SF soldiers trained their Afghan force in basic infantry tactics.

#22

The American base in Afghanistan was Bagram, and it was the first stop for the transport plane carrying Pete Blaber. The base was built in the late 1950s as part of a Soviet aid package for Afghanistan’s left-leaning government. The Soviets knew they might find it useful to have a few good air bases in Afghanistan someday.

#23

Task Force 11, led by Delta Force, was tasked with killing or capturing high-value targets. They were made up of operators from SEAL Team 6 and other black special forces units.

#24

SEAL Team 6 was formed in 1980 to conduct maritime antiterrorist missions, and it never grew to more than about a third of the size of its Army counterpart. But as Team 6 became more proficient, the scorn Delta felt toward it evolved into antagonism.

#25

The decision to insert Team Blue into Afghanistan, which was largely made by JSOC commander Major General Dell Dailey, angered the special operators of Delta, who felt that their Navy counterparts’ limited land warfare training did not prepare them for the extremely demanding missions presented by operations in Afghanistan.

#26

The leadership of TF 11 was changed in January 2002, when Dailey put his entire operation in Masirah and Afghanistan, including his position as the task force commander, on a ninety-day rotation cycle. His replacement was his deputy, Air Force Brigadier General Gregory Trebon.

#27

Harrell was in charge of an intelligence fusion cell that was tasked with sifting through the information the United States was gathering on the movements of high-value targets, and deciding what constituted