249 pages

English

Découvre YouScribe en t'inscrivant gratuitement

Je m'inscris

Exporting the Bomb , livre ebook

Cornell University Press - Matthew Kroenig

Découvre YouScribe en t'inscrivant gratuitement

Je m'inscris

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

249 pages

English

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

A propos
Informations
Extrait

Description

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology-and ignore the security risk-in a desperate search for hard currency.Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves. In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons.

Sujets

Histoire

Military history

Nuclear weapon

Informations

Publié par	Cornell University Press
Date de parution	15 octobre 2011
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9780801458910
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,7500€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

Extrait

EXPORTING THE BOMB

A volume in the series Cornell Studies in Security Affairs edited by Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt

A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

EXPORTING THEBOMB

Technology Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Matthew Kroenig

ITHACA AND LONDON

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2010 by Cornell University Press First printing, Cornell Paperbacks, 2010 Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Kroenig, Matthew. Exporting the bomb : technology transfer and the spread of nuclear weapons / Matthew Kroenig. p. cm. — (Cornell studies in security affairs) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9780801448577 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN 9780801476402 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Nuclear weapons—Political aspects. 2. Arms transfers—Political aspects. 3. Technology transfer—Political aspects. 4. Military assistance—Political aspects. 5. Nuclear nonproliferation—Political aspects. 6. Security, International. I. Title. II. Series: Cornell studies in security affairs. JZ5665.K76 2010 327.1'747—dc22 2009038046

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cloth printing Paperback printing

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Acknowledgments List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Introduction: The Problem of Nuclear Assistance

1. Explaining Nuclear Assistance 2. The Correlates of Nuclear Assistance 3. Israel’s Nuclear Program: French Assistance and U.S. Resistance 4. Common Enemies, Growling Dogs, and A. Q. Khan’s Pakistan: Nuclear Supply in Other Countries 5. Importing the Bomb: Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation

Conclusion: Preventing Nuclear Proliferation

Appendixes: A. Data Appendix for Chapter 2 B. Data Appendix for Chapter 5 C. Cases of Sensitive Nuclear Assistance D. Selected Cases of Nonsensitive Nuclear Assistance E. Selected Cases of Nonassistance Bibliography Index

vii xi

10 50

111

151

173

191 195 197 200 202 205 227

Acknowledgments

This book traces its origins to work I performed as a military analyst in the U.S. 1 government. I was drafting a strategic assessment on how great powers would react to a particular nuclear proliferation issue and was surprised by my own analysis. We often hear that nuclear proliferation poses a general threat to in ternational peace and security and that, for this reason, great powers can work together to combat the threat of nuclear proliferation. Yet, with the issue I was working on, I found great variety in the way countries approached the problem: some countries seemed very threatened by nuclear proliferation and were willing to do almost anything to stop it, others seemed less concerned, and still others were actually helping other countries develop their nuclear weapons programs. I could not understand why countries took such different approaches to what is often thought to be a common problem of nuclear proliferation. More impor tant, I wanted to know why some countries were willing to go so far as to help other countries acquire the deadliest weapons known to mankind. This book is the result of that initial curiosity. A variety of individuals and institutions played a significant role in the produc tion of this book. I owe a special debt of gratitude to advisors in the Department

1. All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. government agency. Nothing in its con tents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the author’s views. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent the disclosure of classified information.

vii

viiiACKNOWLEDGMENTS

of Political Science at the University of California at Berkeley. Steve Weber taught me that an argument can be creative, provocative, and correct, all at the same time. I thank M. Steven Fish for his thoughtful guidance on navigating the acad emy and the wider world beyond it. I thank Giacomo Chiozza for his invaluable advice on measuring and quantitatively analyzing international political events. Michael Nacht provided deep knowledge on nuclear weapons and arms control issues, along with a neverending supply of anecdotes about the policymakers whom I was studying. An early fellowship with the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC) at the University of California convinced me that nuclear proliferation was a subject that demanded further scholarly inquiry. I thank Susan Shirk for her work in establishing the Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Program at the IGCC and for saving me from writing on a less important topic. A research workshop sponsored by the Committee for the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy helped me to refine my proposal. I thank Stephen Biddle, Elizabeth Kier, and Dan Reiter for their detailed comments on my prospectus. I spent a year as a fellow at the Center for International Security and Co operation at Stanford University. I thank Lynn Eden for welcoming me into the vibrant intellectual community that she has helped to create there. I am also deeply indebted to Scott Sagan, whose insights and expertise on the scholarly study of nuclear proliferation assisted me at every stage of this project, all the way from helping me to settle on a question at the beginning of my research to reading and commenting on the entire manuscript upon its completion. A postdoctoral fellowship in the Managing the Atom Project and the Interna tional Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University provided me with the uninterrupted time and supportive environment that helped bring this project to fruition. I thank Steve Miller and Martin Malin for the opportunity to participate in their programs and to take advantage of Harvard’s many resources. I am also grateful for comments provided on this research project over the years by Graham Allison, Victor Asal, Naazneen Barma, Kyle Beardsley, Matthew Bunn, Alisa Carrigan, Ashton Carter, Jonathan Caverley, Alex Downes, Brent Durbin, James Fearon, Edward Fogarty, Matthew Fuhrmann, Erik Gartzke, Charles Glaser, Ron Hassner, Siegfried Hecker, John Holdren, Robert Jervis, Peter Katzenstein, Sarah Kreps, Sean LynnJones, Alex Montgomery, Dan ielle McLaughlin, John Mearsheimer, Jonathan Monten, Patrick Morgan, John Mueller, Tatishe Nteta, Robert Pape, David Patel, Robert Powell, Ely Ratner, Phillip Roessler, Todd Sechser, Jacob Shapiro, Harold Smith, Regine Spector, Paul Stockton, Kevin Wallsten, Christopher Way, Stephen Walt, Dean Wilkening, and Zachary Zwald. My apologies to anyone I forgot.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix

I have also benefited from generous financial support. I thank the Charles and Louise Travers Department of Political Science at U.C. Berkeley; the Institute of International Studies at U.C. Berkeley; the Institute on Global Conflict and Co operation at the University of California; the National Science Foundation; the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University; and the Project on Managing the Atom and the International Security Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. As I was finishing the manuscript, I was also able to benefit from comments at several research seminars across the country. I am grateful for helpful feedback from participants at seminars at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Har vard University, the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, and the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. Parts of this book previously appeared in academic journal articles. I thank Cambridge University Press and Sage Publications for the permission to reprint 2 this material. For helping this book through the publication process, I am grateful to Roger Haydon, the editors of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Series, and the staff at Cornell University Press. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Last, but not least, I thank my family. My parents, Mark and Barb Kroenig, and my siblings, Brad and Julie Kroenig, have been an endless source of support, encouragement, and inspiration in everything that I have ever done. This book is dedicated to them.

2. Parts of this book previously appeared in Matthew Kroenig, “Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance,”American Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 1 (Febru ary 2009), pp. 113–133, reprinted with permission. For chapter 5, the final, definitive version of this paper has been published in Matthew Kroenig, “Importing the Bomb: Sensitive Nuclear Assistance and Nuclear Proliferation,”Journal of Conflict Resolution,Vol. 52, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 161–180, by SAGE Publications Ltd., All rights reserved. ©. The article is available at http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/ content/abstract/53/2/161.