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Cornell University Press - Alexander Thompson

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274 pages

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When President George W. Bush launched an invasion of Iraq in March of 2003, he did so without the explicit approval of the Security Council. His father's administration, by contrast, carefully funneled statecraft through the United Nations and achieved Council authorization for the U.S.-led Gulf War in 1991. The history of American policy toward Iraq displays considerable variation in the extent to which policies were conducted through the UN and other international organizations.In Channels of Power, Alexander Thompson surveys U.S. policy toward Iraq, starting with the Gulf War, continuing through the interwar years of sanctions and coercive disarmament, and concluding with the 2003 invasion and its long aftermath. He offers a framework for understanding why powerful states often work through international organizations when conducting coercive policies-and why they sometimes choose instead to work alone or with ad hoc coalitions. The conventional wisdom holds that because having legitimacy for their actions is important for normative reasons, states seek multilateral approval.Channels of Power offers a rationalist alternative to these standard legitimation arguments, one based on the notion of strategic information transmission: When state actions are endorsed by an independent organization, this sends politically crucial information to the world community, both leaders and their publics, and results in greater international support.

Sujets

Histoire

USA

Iraq

History of the Middle East

International relations

États-Unis

Irak

Informations

Publié par	Cornell University Press
Date de parution	15 décembre 2010
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9780801459375
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	7 Mo

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CHANNELS OF POWER

CHANNELS OFPOWER The UN Security Council and U.S. Statecraft in Iraq

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Alexander Thompson

ITHACA AND LONDON

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2009 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Thompson, Alexander, 1972– Channels of power : the UN Security Council and U.S. statecraft in Iraq / Alexander Thompson. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9780801447181 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—Iraq. 2. Iraq—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United Nations. Security Council—History. 4. United Nations— Iraq. 5. Persian Gulf War, 1991. 6. Iraq War, 2003– I. Title

E183.8.I57T46 2009 956.7044'22—dc22

2008045815

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further informa tion, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cloth printing

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Contents

Preface

1. The Power of International Organizations IOs and Information Transmission Statecraft and IOs The United Nations and the Legitimation of Force Case Selection and Outline 2. Coercion, Institutions, and Information The Politics and Costs of Coercion Institutions and Information Coercion through IOs Two Pathways of Information Transmission Institutional Variation and the Security Council Alternative Arguments Observable Implications and Research Design 3. The Security Council in the Gulf War, 1990–1991 Background and Events Choosing (How) to Intervene Signaling Intentions to State Leaders Transmitting Policy Information to Foreign Publics Assessing the Role of Legitimacy 4. Coercive Disarmament: The Interwar Years Channeling Power between the Wars The Postwar Honeymoon Cracks in the Coalition The Decline of UN Inspections Desert Fox and Its Aftermath The Evolution of U.S. Coercive Strategy Reviving Inspections: A Divided Council 5. The Second Iraq War: Down the UN Path, 2002–2003 From September 11 to Iraq Appealing to the General Assembly Back to the Council: Resolution 1441 Renewed Inspections A Second Resolution? Explaining U.S. Motivations

vii

1 4 7 10 12

16 18 21 24 27 33 39 43

46 48 51 56 66 78

86 89 96 101 107 116 124 127

133 135 137 140 143 149 154

viCONTENTS

6. The Second Iraq War: Bypassing the SecurityCouncil Was It a “Unilateral” Policy? The Costs of Working through the UN Sensitivity to IO Constraints Regional Options: Constrained Forum Shopping International Reactions to Iraq 2003 The International Political Costs of the War 7. Conclusion: How the Security Council Matters Multilateralism in U.S. Foreign Policy Beyond the Superpower The Security Council as a Political Institution

Appendix: Selected Security Council Resolutions Bibliography Index

163 165 168 172 179 180 195

204 206 208 210

215 235 255

Preface

For several months leading up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, all eyes were on Washington—but they were also on New York. The United Nations (UN) played a central role in the international diplomacy and politics of the Iraq war and is still implicated during the postwar reconstruction and democratic con solidation period. The United States has coveted the UN’s stamp of approval, especially in the form of Security Council mandates, throughout the episode. And for good reason: the presence or absence of such mandates has been a criti cal variable in determining both the reaction of the international community to the policies pursued and their ultimate success. In the end, President George W. Bush chose to invade Iraq without authoriza tion from the UN, trading off the political costs of acting alone for the perceived benefits of exercising unfettered power. This latest chapter is a microcosm of a long conflict that began with Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and continued through years of sanctions, weapons inspections, and the use of force in varying degrees. U.S. policy has vacillated between multilateral and unilateral strategies, with some actions channeled through the UN and some not. Surprisingly, these patterns have not been accounted for in the scholarly lit erature. As I followed the string of confrontations and the literature surrounding them, I noticed that almost all existing articles and books have sought to describe or explain particular events, with little effort to unite the entire history of the Iraq–United States conflict under a common framework. This book provides a theoretically driven account of why the United States has so often channeled its power through the Security Council in conducting policies toward Iraq and why,

vii

viiiPREFACE

at certain key junctures, it has not. It aims to explain both the reasons for and the consequences of U.S. actions. The Iraq case is an example of a broader and increasingly important phe nomenon. Today, even the most powerful states routinely direct their coercive foreign policies—from trade retaliation to humanitarian intervention to regime change—through international organizations (IOs). On its face, this is puzzling, since institutional entanglements tend to limit options and constrain power. I explain this behavior by treating IOs as information providers. Standing, independent organizations impose costly constraints and provide neutral assess ments of the policies of coercing states, thereby generating politically important information that leaders and publics can use to screen desirable from undesir able actions. Under certain conditions, coercers have incentives to subject their actions to such scrutiny and limitations because doing so lowers the political costs of exercising power. In other cases, the costs of working through an IO are too high and other options—forms of unilateralism or ad hoc multilateralism— are chosen. The role of IOs in security affairs has never been more important. Military intervention without some effort to gain multilateral approval is now virtually obsolete, a remarkable feature of contemporary international relations that mer its both theoretical and policy attention. The widespread hostility to the 2003 Iraq invasion vividly illustrates the importance attached to multilateral organizations, especially the Security Council, when it comes to the use or threat of force. This book helps us understand the relationship between power and institutions in the international system generally, while shedding particular light on the Security Council’s unique and dramatically expanding role. One clear implication is that the fates of the world’s only superpower and of its preeminent security institution have never been more closely linked. Each needs the other to retain influence.

I am indebted to many individuals and institutions. This project began as my doctoral thesis at the University of Chicago, which was funded through fellow ships from the MacArthur and Mellon Foundations. Though little of the dis sertation has survived years of revisions and events in the real world, it was nevertheless the intellectual seed that grew into this book. My dissertation com mittee—Duncan Snidal, Charles Lipson, Charlie Glaser, and Lloyd Gruber— were frank and critical but always constructive in their criticism. Each of them provided invaluable guidance that made my research more rigorous and inter esting. Duncan in particular has been my leading advocate, advicegiver, and professional role model since I entered graduate school in 1995. His comments on my work are always detailed and incisive—and just plain smart. This book, along with the rest of my work, is much better thanks to him.

PREFACE ix

The PIPES workshop at Chicago was my intellectual home for several years, and the regular participants, both faculty and graduate students, shaped my thinking in important ways. Several provided comments on parts of the disser tation presented there, including Jasen Castillo, Dan Drezner, David Edelstein, Michael Freeman, Seth Jones, Jennifer Mitzen, Brian Portnoy, Susie Pratt, Alex Wendt, and Joel Westra. The political science department at Ohio State provided fertile ground to nur ture the seed into a book. I am fortunate to be surrounded by such a vibrant and diverse group of international relations scholars. Several of my colleagues have commented on parts of the book, including Rick Herrmann, Randy Schweller, Daniel Verdier, and Alex Wendt. Daniel and Alex have been especially support ive and generous with their time. I also received book advice, both practical and intellectual, from Ted Hopf, Marcus Kurtz, John Mueller, and Don Sylvan. I had many research assistants at Ohio State over the years—too many to name, unfor tunately. Burcu Bayram, Erin Graham, Eric Grynaviski, and Clément Wyplosz went beyond their normal duties to offer comments and analysis for parts of the manuscript. My department chairs at Ohio State, Paul Beck, Kathleen McGraw, and Herb Weisberg, made sure I had the time and resources for research and writing. A Faculty Seed Grant from the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences at Ohio State was very helpful during the early stages of the manuscript. The Mershon Center at Ohio State provided two separate grants to fund my bookrelated research, and I am grateful to its director, Rick Herrmann, and the faculty grant committees for supporting this project. I have also received comments on papers related to the book from various col leagues in the field, including Daniel Blake, Robert Brown, Martha Finnemore, Peter Gourevitch, Darren Hawkins, David Lake, Lisa Martin, Jim McCormick, Elizabeth Saunders, Ken Schultz, Mike Tierney, and Kate Weaver. I apologize to those I may have left out. Writing the book would not have been possible without the time and coop eration of many current and former government and international organization officials who allowed me to interview them, sometimes at great length. With only a few exceptions, their names do not appear in the book in order to protect con fidentiality, but their individual and collective contribution to my understanding of important decisions and events covered in this book is immeasurable. Working with Cornell University Press has been a pleasure. I am grateful to Roger Haydon for seeing value in the manuscript and for guiding the project with a judicious hand. Two anonymous reviewers provided unusually extensive and insightful comments that made the book much better than the initial manu script. I hope to thank them in person some day! The editing and production staff