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187 pages

English

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With a thrilling narrative that sheds much light on recent events, this national bestseller brings to life the 1953 CIA coup in Iran that ousted the country’s elected prime minister, ushered in a quarter-century of brutal rule under the Shah, and stimulated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and anti-Americanism in the Middle East. Selected as one of the best books of the year by the Washington Post and The Economist, it now features a new preface by the author on the folly of attacking Iran.

Sujets

Middle Est

HISTORY

Histoire

Irán

Israel

All the Shah's Men

Stephen Kinzer

2003 invasion of Iraq

Middle East

Palestine

World

Iran

Informations

Publié par	Turner Publishing Company
Date de parution	01 janvier 2008
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9781620455302
Langue	English

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Extrait

All the Shah s Men

An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror

STEPHEN KINZER
Copyright 2008, 2003 by Stephen Kinzer. All rights reserved
Published by John Wiley Sons, Inc., Hoboken, New Jersey Published simultaneously in Canada
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Song lyrics on pages 13-14 from Luck Be A Lady from Guys and Dolls by Frank Loesser, 1950 (Renewed) Frank Music Corp. All rights reserved
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kinzer, Stephen. All the Shah s men : an American coup and the roots of Middle East terror / Stephen Kinzer. - 2008 ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-470-18549-0 (pbk.) 1. Iran-Politics and government-1941-1979. 2. Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 1880-1967. 3. United States-Relations-Iran. 4. Iran-Relations-United States. I. Title. DS318.K49 2008 955.05 3-dc22 2007041614
Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
For the People of Iran
There is nothing new in the world except the history you do not know. -H ARRY T RUMAN
CONTENTS
Preface to the 2008 Edition: The Folly of Attacking Iran
Preface
Acknowledgments
Notes on Usage

1. Good Evening, Mr. Roosevelt
2. Curse This Fate
3. The Last Drop of the Nation s Blood
4. A Wave of Oil
5. His Master s Orders
6. Unseen Enemies Everywhere
7. You Do Not Know How Evil They Are
8. An Immensely Shrewd Old Man
9. Block Headed British
10. Pull Up Your Socks and Get Going
11. I Knew It! They Love Me!
12. Purring Like a Giant Cat
Epilogue

Notes
Bibliography
Index
PREFACE TO THE 2008 EDITION

The Folly of Attacking Iran
More than half a century has passed since the United States deposed the only democratic government Iran ever had. This book describes that fateful operation and reviews its disastrous consequences. It tells a story that should serve as an object lesson. Violent intervention in Iran seemed like a good idea in 1953, and for a time it appeared to have succeeded. Now, however, it is clear that this intervention not only brought Iran decades of tragedy, but also set in motion forces that have gravely undermined American national security.
As militants in Washington urge a second American attack on Iran, the story of the first one becomes more urgently relevant than ever. It shows the folly of using violence to try to reshape Iran. In 1953, the United States sought to promote its strategic interest by attacking an Iranian regime of which it disapproved. The results were exactly the opposite of those for which American leaders had hoped.
If the United States had not sent agents to depose Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh in 1953, Iran would probably have continued along its path toward full democracy. Over the decades that followed, it might have become the first democratic state in the Muslim Middle East, and perhaps even a model for other countries in the region and beyond. That would have profoundly changed the course of history-not simply Iranian or even Middle Eastern history, but the history of the United States and the world.
From the perspective of today-the perspective of those who have lived through the September 11 attacks, the Iraq war, and all the attendant threats that have emerged to destabilize the modern world-the 1953 intervention in Iran may be seen as a decisive turning point in twentieth-century history. By placing Mohammad Reza Shah back on his Peacock Throne, the United States brought Iran s long, slow progress toward democracy to a screeching halt. The Shah ruled with increasing repression for twenty-five years. His repression produced the explosion of the late 1970s, later known as the Islamic Revolution. That revolution brought to power a radical clique of fanatically anti-Western clerics who have worked relentlessly, and often violently, to undermine American interests around the world.
In 1953, the United States deposed a popular Iranian nationalist who embraced fundamental American principles and replaced him with a tyrant who despised much of what the United States stands for. Today the West finds itself facing a regime in Tehran that embodies threats far more profound than those that it sought to crush in 1953. In the White House, the impulse to attack Iran seems just as strong as it was then. It is not difficult to imagine the argument some of President Bush s advisers might make in seeking to persuade him. We suffered the September 11 attacks because President Clinton was not bold enough to crush a growing threat, they would say, so let s be real men and crush the threat that s emerging now, rather than leave it to the next administration.
Why attack Iran? Those who favor the idea offer a variety of answers: Iran must not be allowed to become a nuclear power; Iran poses an existential threat to Israel; Iran is the heart of an emerging Shiite crescent that destabilizes the Middle East; Iran supports radical groups in nearby countries; Iran is helping to kill American soldiers in Iraq; Iran has ordered terror attacks in foreign countries; Iran s people are oppressed and need Americans to liberate them.
There is also a geopolitical argument for attacking Iran. Since the beginning of the Cold War era, the United States has used one country in the Middle East as a platform from which to project power across the region. For a quarter-century it was the Shah s Iran. Now it is Saudi Arabia, but prospects for long-term stability there are uncertain. The fantasy that Iraq would become America s key regional ally after a U.S. invasion has dissipated. Some in Washington have a new one: that when the dust clears after an American attack on Iran, it will be stable and friendly to the United States.
The most obvious reason for attacking Iran would be to win access to its vast oil supply. When Winston Churchill helped to seize Iran s oil industry in the 1920s, he called it a prize from fairyland beyond our wildest dreams. It still is. Regardless of what policymakers in Washington or anywhere else may say, no country ever acts in Iran without thinking about its oil reserves. That is especially true of the Bush administration, which is more closely allied with the oil industry than any other administration in American history.
President Bush and those around him may have other reasons to feel tempted by the idea of invading Iran. Some believe, against all evidence, that the key to victory in Iraq is crushing the regime in Iran. Bush himself has said several times that he expects history to absolve him, an argument that can be used to justify even the craziest presidential decisions. Beneath these arguments lies another, more diffuse impulse.
American leaders, emphatically including President Bush himself, believe that since the United States is a great power, it has the right and responsibility to act dramatically whenever trouble emerges anywhere in the world. This impulse dates at least to the age of Thucydides, who wrote that nations have an innate compulsion to rule when empowered. More recently, in a study of the Spanish-American War that holds great relevance for today, the British historian Joseph Smith wrote that America s eagerness to attack foreign lands stems from an aggressive national egoism and a romantic attachment to national power. Some in Washington believe that invading, overthrowing, and occupying are simply what great nations do. Otherwise, they argue, there is no point in having power.
At this moment in history, if there s a problem, we re expected to deal with it, President Bush said before launching the invasion of Iraq. By his standards, Iran has certainly become a problem. That suggests he may decide to order an attack in order to deal with it.
Before great powers take far-reaching decisions that can reshape the world, their leaders normally consider the lessons of history. Any serious discussion about modern Iran, and certainly any d