Summary of David E. Sanger's The Perfect Weapon , livre ebook

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35 pages

English

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Please note: This is a companion version & not the original book.
Sample Book Insights:
#1 In 2012, I met with Michael Morell, the deputy director of the CIA, to discuss a sensitive story the Times was preparing to publish. I knew that the meeting would be difficult, as the US government was not yet ready to discuss the consequences of its decision to use cyberweapons against another state in peacetime.
#2 I had come to hear about which details of the Olympic Games story concerned Morell and his colleagues, and they were preparing to ask the Times to withhold them, lest we tip off other targets of ongoing operations.
#3 The Obama administration was extremely secretive about its use of cyberweapons, and it was unclear how the public should feel about them. But there was no backtracking. When Michael Hayden, who had been central to the early days of America’s experimentation with cyberweapons, said that the Stuxnet code had the whiff of August 1945 about it, he was making clear that a new era had dawned.
#4 Hayden’s insight into the game-changing nature of cyber conflict began in 1998, when he was assigned to San Antonio, Texas, as the commander of the Air Intelligence Agency. He remembered watching in wonder as members of the staff disabled remote workstations and used electronic-warfare techniques to fool a radarscope.

Sujets

Computers

Informatique

General officer

Security

General

Informations

Publié par	Everest Media LLC
Date de parution	23 juillet 2022
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9798822546448
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	1 Mo

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Insights on David E. Sanger's The Perfect Weapon
Contents Insights from Chapter 1 Insights from Chapter 2 Insights from Chapter 3 Insights from Chapter 4 Insights from Chapter 5 Insights from Chapter 6 Insights from Chapter 7 Insights from Chapter 8 Insights from Chapter 9 Insights from Chapter 10 Insights from Chapter 11 Insights from Chapter 12
Insights from Chapter 1

#1

In 2012, I met with Michael Morell, the deputy director of the CIA, to discuss a sensitive story the Times was preparing to publish. I knew that the meeting would be difficult, as the US government was not yet ready to discuss the consequences of its decision to use cyberweapons against another state in peacetime.

#2

I had come to hear about which details of the Olympic Games story concerned Morell and his colleagues, and they were preparing to ask the Times to withhold them, lest we tip off other targets of ongoing operations.

#3

The Obama administration was extremely secretive about its use of cyberweapons, and it was unclear how the public should feel about them. But there was no backtracking. When Michael Hayden, who had been central to the early days of America’s experimentation with cyberweapons, said that the Stuxnet code had the whiff of August 1945 about it, he was making clear that a new era had dawned.

#4

Hayden’s insight into the game-changing nature of cyber conflict began in 1998, when he was assigned to San Antonio, Texas, as the commander of the Air Intelligence Agency. He remembered watching in wonder as members of the staff disabled remote workstations and used electronic-warfare techniques to fool a radarscope.

#5

The attack forced the United States to confront the implications of the digital age. The NSA, responsible for encrypting and protecting sensitive information, shifted its focus to computer data stored around the world that was vulnerable to the agency’s fast-growing cadres of hackers.

#6

Strategic Command is in charge of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. It was the first line of defense against a nuclear conflict with the Soviets, and it was responsible for maintaining and moving nuclear weapons.

#7

Cartwright was concerned about the strategic vacuum. America’s reliance on nuclear deterrence was actually restricting a president’s ability to deal with the kind of adversaries the United States was facing every day. He began thinking about how cyberweapons could expand a president’s choices.

#8

The 2008 election proved to be a wake-up call for the nation’s intelligence chiefs. Chinese hackers were inside the networks of military contractors, and they had stolen plans for the F-35, the world’s most expensive fighter jet.

#9

The Bush administration had a covert program to infect the computer controllers at the Iranian nuclear plant, hoping to slow the Iranians and force them to the bargaining table. They also wanted to dissuade Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel from bombing Iran.

#10

The attack on the Iranian nuclear plant was a way to keep the Israelis focused on crippling the Iranian program without setting off a regional war. But the code got out into the wild in 2010, and quickly replicated itself in computer systems around the world.

#11

The code seemed to be partially autonomous; it didn’t require anyone to pull the trigger. It relied on four sophisticated zero-day exploits, which allowed the code to spread without human help.

#12

The code contained several clues that pointed to Israel. It was clear that the country had built a giant replica of the Natanz enrichment site at their own nuclear weapons site, Dimona.

#13

The discovery that Israel had built a replica of the Natanz plant drove home how central a role the Israelis had played in developing the Stuxnet malware. Dagan, the Mossad chief who had ordered the killings of many Arabs, was more strategically savvy than most Israelis knew. He wanted to dissuade Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu from bombing Iran.

#14

By 2010, Dagan was under tremendous pressure to show Netanyahu that a more covert, more sophisticated approach to crippling the Iranian program could succeed. He believed that Israel’s technology made it extremely difficult for the Iranians to figure out the origin of the attack.

#15

I had pieced together the highlights of the story of the strategy and debates swirling around the decision to unleash Stuxnet. I went to the Obama White House to see if they were ready to talk about what had happened and any national security concerns they might have about publishing the details.

#16

I visited with Benjamin Rhodes, the former novelist and graceful speechwriter who handled a portfolio of diplomatic issues for Obama, including the opening of Cuba. He suggested I visit General Cartwright.

#17

I went to see Cartwright, who was close to Obama. He made it clear that he could not discuss classified details, but he argued with a few conclusions in my story. In the end, he asked for only a handful of deletions. None was essential to telling the story of the most sophisticated state-sponsored cyberattack in history.

#18

Obama himself performed a delicate dance in response to the leaks: he couldn’t confirm or deny the story, but he wanted the world to know he wasn’t the source. The Justice Department launched a leak investigation, which Attorney General Eric Holder announced around the same time.

#19

The government could have used the Cartwright case to discuss how cyber is crucial to avoiding a shooting war in the Middle East, but it did not. The Pentagon and the intelligence agencies were unwilling to discuss publicly how they might limit the use of cyberweapons, in times of both war and peace.

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Summary of David E. Sanger's The Perfect Weapon , livre ebook

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