246 pages

English

Découvre YouScribe en t'inscrivant gratuitement

Je m'inscris

Currency of Confidence , livre ebook

Cornell University Press - C. Nelson Stephen

Découvre YouScribe en t'inscrivant gratuitement

Je m'inscris

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

246 pages

English

Obtenez un accès à la bibliothèque pour le consulter en ligne
En savoir plus

A propos
Informations
Extrait

Description

The IMF is a purposive actor in world politics, primarily driven by a set of homogenous economic ideas, Stephen C. Nelson suggests, and its professional staff emerged from an insular set of American-trained economists. The IMF treats countries differently depending on whether that staff trusts the country's top officials; that trust in turn depends on the educational credentials of the policy team that Fund officials face across the negotiating table. Intellectual differences thus lead to lasting economic effects for the citizens of countries seeking IMF support.Based on deep archival research in IMF archives and personnel files, Nelson argues that the IMF has been the Johnny Appleseed of neoliberalism: neoliberal policymakers sprout and take root in countries that have spent recent decades living under the Fund's conditional lending arrangements. Nelson supports his argument through quantitative measures and illustrates the dynamics of relations between the Fund and client countries in a detailed examination of newly available archives of four periods in Argentina's long and often bitter relations with the IMF. The Currency of Confidence ends with Nelson's examination of how the IMF emerged from the global financial crisis as an unexpected victor.

Sujets

Banking

Economie gestion

Bank

Monetary economics

International relations

Political economy

Economics

Central

Informations

Publié par	Cornell University Press
Date de parution	07 février 2017
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9781501708305
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,7500€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

Extrait

THE CURRENCY OF CONFIDENCE

A volume in the series Cornell Studies in Money edited by Eric Helleiner and Jonathan Kirshner

A list of titles in this series is available at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

THE CURRENCYOFCONFIDENCE How Economic Beliefs Shape the IMF’s Relationship with Its Borrowers

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Stephen C. Nelson

ITHACA AND LONDON

Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a grant from the Kaplan Institute for the Humanities, Northwestern University, which aided in the publication of this book.

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2017 by Cornell University Press Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Names: Nelson, Stephen C., 1980– author. Title: The currency of confidence : how economic beliefs shape the IMF’s relationship with its borrowers / Stephen C. Nelson. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016035600 (print) | LCCN 2016036594 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501705120 (cloth : alk. paper) | ISBN 9781501708299 (epub/mobi) | ISBN 9781501708305 (pdf) Subjects: LCSH: International Monetary Fund. | Loans, Foreign. | Financial crises. | Neoliberalism. Classification: LCC HG3881.5.I58 N45 2017 (print) | LCC HG3881.5.I58 (ebook) | DDC 332.1/52—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016035600

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetablebased, lowVOC inks and acidfree papers that are recycled, totally chlorinefree, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cover: IMF mission to Romania, press conference in Bucharest, 25 March 2009. EPA european pressphoto agency b.v./Alamy Stock Photo/ROBERT GHEMENT. Cover design: Richanna Patrick.

Contents

List of Tables and Figures Acknowledgments

1.2.

4.5.

Understanding the IMF and Its BorrowersHow Shared Economic Beliefs Shape Loan Size, Conditionality, and Enforcement DecisionsPlaying Favorites: Quantitative Evidence Linking Shared Economic Beliefs to Variation in IMF TreatmentArgentina and the IMF in Turbulent Times, 1976–1984From One Crisis to the Next: IMFArgentine Relations, 1985–2002Staying Alive: IMF Lending Programs and the Political Survival of Economic PolicymakersImplications, Extensions, and Speculations: The IMF and Its Borrowers, in and out of Hard Times

References Index

vii ix

118

166

189

211 227

Tables and Figures

Tables 1.1.Typology of political explanations of IMFborrower relations3.1.Construction of proportion neoliberal variable over time4.1.Organization of case study5.1.Economic performance of Argentina, 1980s–2000s5.2.Overview of case study of Argentina6.1.Average tenure of policymakers in countries not under IMF programs, 1980–20006.2.Statistical relationship between proportion neoliberal and time spent under IMF lending arrangements7.1.Explanations for variation in treatment of borrowers by IMF7.2.Covariates of size of IMF loans, 2008–2013

Figures 2.1.Shared beliefs reduce preferred number of IMF conditions in lending program negotiations3.1.(Relative) size of IMF programs over time3.2.Performance criteria in IMF programs3.3.Covariates of relative loan size3.4.Correlation of proportion neoliberal with loan size indicator under different model specifications3.5.Covariates of performance criteria in IMF programs3.6.Effect of proportion neoliberal on predicted number of conditions3.7.Correlation of proportion neoliberal with number of binding conditions in IMF agreements under different model specifications

vii

139

164

183

186

192

208

viiiTABLES AND FIGURES

3.8.Covariates of issuance of waivers in IMF programs 3.9.Effect of proportion neoliberal on predicted probability of receiving a waiver3.10.Covariates of number of waivers for borrowing countries3.11.Effect of proportion neoliberal on predicted number of waivers 5.1.Total tax revenues of South American governments, 1980–1999 6.1.KaplanMeier survival estimates for finance ministers under IMF programs, stratified by neoliberal indicator 6.2.KaplanMeier survival estimates for central bankers under IMF programs, stratified by neoliberal indicator 6.3.Covariates of tenure of finance ministers in IMF program countries 6.4.Covariates of tenure of central bankers in IMF program countries 6.5.Bivariate correlation between average value of proportion neoliberal in 1990s and fraction of years spent under IMF agreements since 1975

148

175

180

181

185

Acknowledgments

It has become a habit to read the acknowledgments of every book I pick up. A notinsubstantial share open with something along these lines: “this book took far longer to finish than I care to admit.” This book took far longer to finish than I care to admit. Many people earned my gratitude for helping me to actually complete it. Since it started its life in the Department of Government at Cornell University, I thank Peter Katzenstein, Jonathan Kirshner, Nic van de Walle, and Chris Way for their guidance when I started down this path. Tom Pepinsky served as an additional reader and supplied, as expected, tough and trenchant comments that aided in the process of writing this book. Peter, in particular, must be singled out for more than living up to his legendary reputation as a mentor. He has been there with sound advice and deep insight every step of the way. The seeds of the book lie in a paper written for Peter’s graduate seminar in international relations. That paper marked my first look into the world of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). And Peter has been there every step of the way since. I have been very lucky to work on this book while a member of the Politi cal Science Department at Northwestern University. I owe my colleagues Karen Alter and Hendrik Spruyt sizable debts for the detailed and incisive comments they provided on a first draft of the book. Bruce Carruthers gave me extremely helpful feedback on what became chapter 6 and has been a consistent source of inspiration, on this and many other projects. Henry Bienen’s interest in my work on the IMF and its borrowers was a strong signal that I should keep at it. Jordan GansMorse generously shared his expertise on the concept of neoliberal economic beliefs that is at the core of my argument in this book. I have benefited from the kindness and wisdom of many of my political science colleagues in Scott Hall and in the broader Northwestern community; it would be impossible to thank each individual at Northwestern who in some way helped me during this process, but rest assured, I know that I owe you one. I discussed some of the core ideas in this book with the very smart students in my graduate seminars at Northwestern. The seminar participants probably do not remember the incisive comments that they offered, but I do. Several Northwestern undergraduates helped me collect data for the analyses in chap ters 3 and 7. I thank Sarah Green, Nandi Mehta, and Dor Srebernik for their perspicacious work.

xACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many scholars spent a valuable currency—their time—reading my work and offering their feedback on it. Sections of this book have been presented to semi nars and workshops hosted at Brown University, Cornell University, George town University, Northwestern, the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, the University of Wisconsin, and the University of Minnesota. Too many people of fered helpful critiques and suggestions before, during, and after these seminars to thank each individually; I will, however, single out Bentley Allan, Mark Blyth, Mark Copelovitch, Chris ForsterSmith, Ron Krebs, Kate McNamara, Abe New man, JongHee Park, Len Seabrooke, Dave Steinberg, Kate Weaver, and Jessica Weeks for sharing their insights on different parts of the project. I also presented findings from this research at the annual meetings of the American Political Sci ence Association, the International Political Economy Society, and the Midwest Political Science Association; in addition to comments from the audience mem bers and fellow panelists at these meetings, I am grateful for the conversations with Irfan Nooruddin, Stephen Kaplan, and Matthew Winters. It was my good fortune that a towering figure in the fields of international economics and international political economy, Tom Willett, was interested enough in the project to read the entire manuscript and to provide illuminating comments. This book would not have been possible without the patient advice and help offered by the IMF archivist, Premela Isaac. I thank Christian Brachet and Des mond Lachman for taking the time to share their personal reflections on the Fund programs in Argentina, and I am grateful to the numerous executive direc tors of the IMF who helped me better understand the work of the organization and how the organization works. I am grateful to Sergio Chodos for taking an interest in the work and for his insights on all things related to Argentina, the Fund, and the workings of the international economy. My most recent (and rather sizable) debts are owed to the anonymous re viewers of the book for Cornell University Press, and to Roger Haydon and Eric Helleiner, who shepherded this book during its long journey with great care and patience. Sections of the argument and evidence in chapters 1 and 3 draw on a previ ously published article, “Playing Favorites: How Shared Beliefs Shape the IMF’s Lending Decisions” (Nelson 2014b). Some of the material in chapter 7 appeared in a volume edited by Manuela Moschella and Kate Weaver (Nelson 2014a). Finally, I thank my family and friends for supporting me in endeavors per sonal and professional. Andy Engel and Jenna Feldman always asked, with sensitivity and genuine interest, about how the book was coming along. Elliott Feldman and Cindy Mogul offered support when we really needed it. Maeve