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pubOne.info present you this new edition. The Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which the style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, the multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of expression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the earlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages; instead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now concealed, but always present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as we may venture to term them. We may observe an attempt at artificial ornament, and far-fetched modes of expression; also clamorous demands on the part of his companions, that Socrates shall answer his own questions, as well as other defects of style, which remind us of the Laws

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Publié par	Pub One Info
Date de parution	06 novembre 2010
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9782819934523
Langue	English

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PHILEBUS
By Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.
The Philebus appears to be one of the later writingsof Plato, in which the style has begun to alter, and the dramaticand poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative andphilosophical. In the development of abstract thought greatadvances have been made on the Protagoras or the Phaedrus, and evenon the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution ofartistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a labouredmarch in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompletenessin the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides, themultiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power ofexpression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of theearlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages;instead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, nowconcealed, but always present, are inserted a good many bad jests,as we may venture to term them. We may observe an attempt atartificial ornament, and far-fetched modes of expression; alsoclamorous demands on the part of his companions, that Socratesshall answer his own questions, as well as other defects of style,which remind us of the Laws. The connection is often abrupt andinharmonious, and far from clear. Many points require furtherexplanation; e. g. the reference of pleasure to the indefiniteclass, compared with the assertion which almost immediatelyfollows, that pleasure and pain naturally have their seat in thethird or mixed class: these two statements are unreconciled. Inlike manner, the table of goods does not distinguish between thetwo heads of measure and symmetry; and though a hint is given thatthe divine mind has the first place, nothing is said of this in thefinal summing up. The relation of the goods to the sciences doesnot appear; though dialectic may be thought to correspond to thehighest good, the sciences and arts and true opinions areenumerated in the fourth class. We seem to have an intimation of afurther discussion, in which some topics lightly passed over wereto receive a fuller consideration. The various uses of the word'mixed, ' for the mixed life, the mixed class of elements, themixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a further sourceof perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions which Plato isattacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in acontroversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they wereintended to refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply whatPlato has not told us; or to explain, from our fragmentaryknowledge of them, the relation in which his doctrine stood to theEleatic Being or the Megarian good, or to the theories ofAristippus or Antisthenes respecting pleasure. Nor are we able tosay how far Plato in the Philebus conceives the finite and infinite(which occur both in the fragments of Philolaus and in thePythagorean table of opposites) in the same manner as contemporaryPythagoreans.
There is little in the characters which is worthy ofremark. The Socrates of the Philebus is devoid of any touch ofSocratic irony, though here, as in the Phaedrus, he twiceattributes the flow of his ideas to a sudden inspiration. Theinterlocutor Protarchus, the son of Callias, who has been a hearerof Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a disciple of the partisans ofpleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite side by the argumentsof Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are easily induced totake the better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from theargument, is several times brought back again, that he may supportpleasure, of which he remains to the end the uncompromisingadvocate. On the other hand, the youthful group of listeners bywhom he is surrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as they are termed, whosepresence is several times intimated, are described as all of themat last convinced by the arguments of Socrates. They bear a veryfaded resemblance to the interested audiences of the Charmides,Lysis, or Protagoras. Other signs of relation to external life inthe dialogue, or references to contemporary things and persons,with the single exception of the allusions to the anonymous enemiesof pleasure, and the teachers of the flux, there are none.
The omission of the doctrine of recollection,derived from a previous state of existence, is a note of progressin the philosophy of Plato. The transcendental theory ofpre-existent ideas, which is chiefly discussed by him in the Meno,the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given way to a psychological one.The omission is rendered more significant by his having occasion tospeak of memory as the basis of desire. Of the ideas he treats inthe same sceptical spirit which appears in his criticism of them inthe Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties and he gives noanswer to them. His mode of speaking of the analytical andsynthetical processes may be compared with his discussion of thesame subject in the Phaedrus; here he dwells on the importance ofdividing the genera into all the species, while in the Phaedrus heconveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks of carving thewhole, which is described under the image of a victim, into partsor members, 'according to their natural articulation, withoutbreaking any of them. ' There is also a difference, which may benoted, between the two dialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, andalso in the Symposium, the dialectician is described as a sort ofenthusiast or lover, in the Philebus, as in all the later writingsof Plato, the element of love is wanting; the topic is onlyintroduced, as in the Republic, by way of illustration. On othersubjects of which they treat in common, such as the nature andkinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of the good,the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is lessadvanced than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, moremetaphysical truth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonicdialogue. Here, as Plato expressly tells us, he is 'forging weaponsof another make, ' i. e. new categories and modes of conception,though 'some of the old ones might do again. '
But if superior in thought and dialectical power,the Philebus falls very far short of the Republic in fancy andfeeling. The development of the reason undisturbed by the emotionsseems to be the ideal at which Plato aims in his later dialogues.There is no mystic enthusiasm or rapturous contemplation of ideas.Whether we attribute this change to the greater feebleness of age,or to the development of the quarrel between philosophy and poetryin Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some degree, to a carelessnessabout artistic effect, when he was absorbed in abstract ideas, wecan hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety ofindications, derived from style as well as subject, that thePhilebus belongs to the later period of his life and authorship.But in this, as in all the later writings of Plato, there are notwanting thoughts and expressions in which he rises to his highestlevel.
The plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, thewant of plan renders the progress of the dialogue difficult tofollow. A few leading ideas seem to emerge: the relation of the oneand many, the four original elements, the kinds of pleasure, thekinds of knowledge, the scale of goods. These are only partiallyconnected with one another. The dialogue is not rightly entitled'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good, ' but should rather bedescribed as treating of the relations of pleasure and knowledge,after they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The questionis asked, whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or somenature higher than either; and if the latter, how pleasure andwisdom are related to this higher good. (2) Before we can replywith exactness, we must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds ofknowledge. (3) But still we may affirm generally, that the combinedlife of pleasure and wisdom or knowledge has more of the characterof the good than either of them when isolated. (4) to determinewhich of them partakes most of the higher nature, we must knowunder which of the four unities or elements they respectively fall.These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the finite; thirdly, theunion of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union. Pleasure is ofthe first, wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while reason ormind is akin to the fourth or highest.
(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed andunmixed. Of mixed pleasures there are three classes— (a) those inwhich both the pleasures and pains are corporeal, as in eating andhunger; (b) those in which there is a pain of the body and pleasureof the mind, as when you are hungry and are looking forward to afeast; (c) those in which the pleasure and pain are both mental. Ofunmixed pleasures there are four kinds: those of sight, hearing,smell, knowledge.
(6) The sciences are likewise divided into twoclasses, theoretical and productive: of the latter, one part ispure, the other impure. The pure part consists of arithmetic,mensuration, and weighing. Arts like carpentering, which have anexact measure, are to be regarded as higher than music, which forthe most part is mere guess-work. But there is also a higherarithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusivelytheoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still andthe truest and purest knowledge.
(7) We are now able to determine the composition ofthe perfect life. First, we admit the pure pleasures and the puresciences; secondly, the impure sciences, but not the impurepleasures. We have next to discover what element of goodness iscontained in this mixture. There are three criteria of goodness—beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more akin to reason thanto pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places of both of themin the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the secondplace is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom; thefourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to purepleasures;