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pubOne.info present you this new edition. This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question of Meno, who asks, 'whether virtue can be taught. ' Socrates replies that he does not as yet know what virtue is, and has never known anyone who did. 'Then he cannot have met Gorgias when he was at Athens. ' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a bad memory, and has forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his own notion, which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O yes- nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an old man, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state of life, all of which may be easily described.

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Publié par	Pub One Info
Date de parution	06 novembre 2010
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9782819933700
Langue	English

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MENO
by Plato
Translated by Benjamin Jowett
INTRODUCTION.
This Dialogue begins abruptly with a question ofMeno, who asks, 'whether virtue can be taught. ' Socrates repliesthat he does not as yet know what virtue is, and has never knownanyone who did. 'Then he cannot have met Gorgias when he was atAthens. ' Yes, Socrates had met him, but he has a bad memory, andhas forgotten what Gorgias said. Will Meno tell him his own notion,which is probably not very different from that of Gorgias? 'O yes—nothing easier: there is the virtue of a man, of a woman, of an oldman, and of a child; there is a virtue of every age and state oflife, all of which may be easily described. '
Socrates reminds Meno that this is only anenumeration of the virtues and not a definition of the notion whichis common to them all. In a second attempt Meno defines virtue tobe 'the power of command. ' But to this, again, exceptions aretaken. For there must be a virtue of those who obey, as well as ofthose who command; and the power of command must be justly or notunjustly exercised. Meno is very ready to admit that justice isvirtue: 'Would you say virtue or a virtue, for there are othervirtues, such as courage, temperance, and the like; just as roundis a figure, and black and white are colours, and yet there areother figures and other colours. Let Meno take the examples offigure and colour, and try to define them. ' Meno confesses hisinability, and after a process of interrogation, in which Socratesexplains to him the nature of a 'simile in multis, ' Socrateshimself defines figure as 'the accompaniment of colour. ' But someone may object that he does not know the meaning of the word'colour; ' and if he is a candid friend, and not a mere disputant,Socrates is willing to furnish him with a simpler and morephilosophical definition, into which no disputed word is allowed tointrude: 'Figure is the limit of form. ' Meno imperiously insiststhat he must still have a definition of colour. Some railleryfollows; and at length Socrates is induced to reply, 'that colouris the effluence of form, sensible, and in due proportion to thesight. ' This definition is exactly suited to the taste of Meno,who welcomes the familiar language of Gorgias and Empedocles.Socrates is of opinion that the more abstract or dialecticaldefinition of figure is far better.
Now that Meno has been made to understand the natureof a general definition, he answers in the spirit of a Greekgentleman, and in the words of a poet, 'that virtue is to delightin things honourable, and to have the power of getting them. ' Thisis a nearer approximation than he has yet made to a completedefinition, and, regarded as a piece of proverbial or popularmorality, is not far from the truth. But the objection is urged,'that the honourable is the good, ' and as every one equallydesires the good, the point of the definition is contained in thewords, 'the power of getting them. ' 'And they must be got justlyor with justice. ' The definition will then stand thus: 'Virtue isthe power of getting good with justice. ' But justice is a part ofvirtue, and therefore virtue is the getting of good with a part ofvirtue. The definition repeats the word defined.
Meno complains that the conversation of Socrates hasthe effect of a torpedo's shock upon him. When he talks with otherpersons he has plenty to say about virtue; in the presence ofSocrates, his thoughts desert him. Socrates replies that he is onlythe cause of perplexity in others, because he is himself perplexed.He proposes to continue the enquiry. But how, asks Meno, can heenquire either into what he knows or into what he does not know?This is a sophistical puzzle, which, as Socrates remarks, saves agreat deal of trouble to him who accepts it. But the puzzle has areal difficulty latent under it, to which Socrates will endeavourto find a reply. The difficulty is the origin of knowledge:—
He has heard from priests and priestesses, and fromthe poet Pindar, of an immortal soul which is born again and againin successive periods of existence, returning into this world whenshe has paid the penalty of ancient crime, and, having wanderedover all places of the upper and under world, and seen and knownall things at one time or other, is by association out of one thingcapable of recovering all. For nature is of one kindred; and everysoul has a seed or germ which may be developed into all knowledge.The existence of this latent knowledge is further proved by theinterrogation of one of Meno's slaves, who, in the skilful hands ofSocrates, is made to acknowledge some elementary relations ofgeometrical figures. The theorem that the square of the diagonal isdouble the square of the side— that famous discovery of primitivemathematics, in honour of which the legendary Pythagoras is said tohave sacrificed a hecatomb— is elicited from him. The first step inthe process of teaching has made him conscious of his ownignorance. He has had the 'torpedo's shock' given him, and is thebetter for the operation. But whence had the uneducated man thisknowledge? He had never learnt geometry in this world; nor was itborn with him; he must therefore have had it when he was not a man.And as he always either was or was not a man, he must have alwayshad it. (Compare Phaedo. )
After Socrates has given this specimen of the truenature of teaching, the original question of the teachableness ofvirtue is renewed. Again he professes a desire to know 'what virtueis' first. But he is willing to argue the question, asmathematicians say, under an hypothesis. He will assume that ifvirtue is knowledge, then virtue can be taught. (This was the stageof the argument at which the Protagoras concluded. )
Socrates has no difficulty in showing that virtue isa good, and that goods, whether of body or mind, must be under thedirection of knowledge. Upon the assumption just made, then, virtueis teachable. But where are the teachers? There are none to befound. This is extremely discouraging. Virtue is no soonerdiscovered to be teachable, than the discovery follows that it isnot taught. Virtue, therefore, is and is not teachable.
In this dilemma an appeal is made to Anytus, arespectable and well-to-do citizen of the old school, and a familyfriend of Meno, who happens to be present. He is asked 'whetherMeno shall go to the Sophists and be taught. ' The suggestionthrows him into a rage. 'To whom, then, shall Meno go? ' asksSocrates. To any Athenian gentleman— to the great Athenianstatesmen of past times. Socrates replies here, as elsewhere(Laches, Prot. ), that Themistocles, Pericles, and other great men,had sons to whom they would surely, if they could have done so,have imparted their own political wisdom; but no one ever heardthat these sons of theirs were remarkable for anything exceptriding and wrestling and similar accomplishments. Anytus is angryat the imputation which is cast on his favourite statesmen, and ona class to which he supposes himself to belong; he breaks off witha significant hint. The mention of another opportunity of talkingwith him, and the suggestion that Meno may do the Athenian people aservice by pacifying him, are evident allusions to the trial ofSocrates.
Socrates returns to the consideration of thequestion 'whether virtue is teachable, ' which was denied on theground that there are no teachers of it: (for the Sophists are badteachers, and the rest of the world do not profess to teach). Butthere is another point which we failed to observe, and in whichGorgias has never instructed Meno, nor Prodicus Socrates. This isthe nature of right opinion. For virtue may be under the guidanceof right opinion as well as of knowledge; and right opinion is forpractical purposes as good as knowledge, but is incapable of beingtaught, and is also liable, like the images of Daedalus, to 'walkoff, ' because not bound by the tie of the cause. This is the sortof instinct which is possessed by statesmen, who are not wise orknowing persons, but only inspired or divine. The higher virtue,which is identical with knowledge, is an ideal only. If thestatesman had this knowledge, and could teach what he knew, hewould be like Tiresias in the world below, — 'he alone has wisdom,but the rest flit like shadows. '
This Dialogue is an attempt to answer the question,Can virtue be taught? No one would either ask or answer such aquestion in modern times. But in the age of Socrates it was only byan effort that the mind could rise to a general notion of virtue asdistinct from the particular virtues of courage, liberality, andthe like. And when a hazy conception of this ideal was attained, itwas only by a further effort that the question of the teachablenessof virtue could be resolved.
The answer which is given by Plato is paradoxicalenough, and seems rather intended to stimulate than to satisfyenquiry. Virtue is knowledge, and therefore virtue can be taught.But virtue is not taught, and therefore in this higher and idealsense there is no virtue and no knowledge. The teaching of theSophists is confessedly inadequate, and Meno, who is their pupil,is ignorant of the very nature of general terms. He can onlyproduce out of their armoury the sophism, 'that you can neitherenquire into what you know nor into what you do not know; ' towhich Socrates replies by his theory of reminiscence.
To the doctrine that virtue is knowledge, Plato hasbeen constantly tending in the previous Dialogues. But the newtruth is no sooner found than it vanishes away. 'If there isknowledge, there must be teachers; and where are the teachers? 'There is no knowledge in the higher sense of systematic, connected,reasoned knowledge, such as may one day be attained, and such asPlato himself seems to see in some far off vision of a singlescience. And there are no teachers in the higher sense of the word;that is to say, no real teachers who will arouse the spirit ofenquiry in their pupils, and not merely instruct them in rhetoricor impart to them ready-made inform