Memoirs of Napoleon - Volume 03 , livre ebook

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pubOne.info present you this new edition. Establishment of a divan in each Egyptian province- Desaix in Upper Egypt- Ibrahim Bey beaten by Bonaparte at Balehye'h- Sulkowsky wounded- Disaster at Abonkir- Dissatisfaction and murmurs of the army- Dejection of the General-in-Chief- His plan respecting Egypt - Meditated descent upon England- Bonaparte's censure of the Directory- Intercepted correspondence.

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Publié par	Pub One Info
Date de parution	06 novembre 2010
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9782819949008
Langue	English

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MEMOIRS OF NAPOLEON BONAPARTE, VOLUME 3.
By LOUIS ANTOINE FAUVELET DE BOURRIENNE
His Private Secretary
CHAPTER XV.
1798.
Establishment of a divan in each Egyptian province—Desaix in Upper Egypt— Ibrahim Bey beaten by Bonaparte atBalehye'h— Sulkowsky wounded— Disaster at Abonkir— Dissatisfactionand murmurs of the army— Dejection of the General-in-Chief— Hisplan respecting Egypt — Meditated descent upon England— Bonaparte'scensure of the Directory— Intercepted correspondence.
From the details I have already given respectingBonaparte's plans for colonising Egypt, it will be seen that hisenergy of mind urged him to adopt anticipatory measures for theaccomplishment of objects which were never realised. During theshort interval in which he sheathed his sword he plannedprovisional governments for the towns and provinces occupied by theFrench troops, and he adroitly contrived to serve the interests ofhis army without appearing to violate those of the country. Afterhe had been four days at Cairo, during which time he employedhimself in examining everything, and consulting every individualfrom whom he could obtain useful information, he published thefollowing order:
HEADQUARTERS, CAIRO,
9th Thermidor, year VI.
BONAPARTE, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE,AND GENERAL-IN-CHIEF, ORDERS:
Art. 1. There shall be in each province of Egypt adivan, composed of seven individuals, whose duty will be tosuperintend the interests of the province; to communicate to me anycomplaints that may be made; to prevent warfare among the differentvillages; to apprehend and punish criminals (for which purpose theymay demand assistance from the French commandant); and to takeevery opportunity of enlightening the people.
Art. 2. There shall be in each province an aga ofthe Janizaries, maintaining constant communication with the Frenchcommandant. He shall have with him a company of sixty armednatives, whom he may take wherever he pleases, for the maintenanceof good order, subordination, and tranquillity.
Art. 3. There shall be in each province anintendant, whose business will be to levy the miri, the feddam, andthe other contributions which formerly belonged to the Mamelukes,but which now belong to the French Republic. The intendants shallhave us many agents as may be necessary.
Art. 4. The said intendant shall have a French agentto correspond
with the Finance Department, and to execute all theorders he may
receive.
(Signed) BONAPARTE.
While Bonaparte was thus actively taking measuresfor the organization of the country,
— [Far more thoroughly and actively than those takenby the English
Government in 1882-3-4]—
General Desaix had marched into Upper Egypt inpursuit of Mourad Bey. We learned that Ibrahim, who, next toMourad, was the most influential of the bays, had proceeded towardsSyria, by the way of Belbeis and Salehye'h. The General-in-Chiefimmediately determined to march in person against that formidableenemy, and he left Cairo about fifteen days after he had enteredit. It is unnecessary to describe the well- known engagement inwhich Bonaparte drove Ibrahim back upon El-Arish; besides, I do notenter minutely into the details of battles, my chief object beingto record events which I personally witnessed.
At the battle of Salehye'h Bonaparte thought he hadlost one of his 'aides de camp', Sulkowsky, to whom he was muchattached, and who had been with us during the whole of the campaignof Italy. On the field of battle one object of regret cannot longengross the mind; yet, on his return to Cairo, Bonaparte frequentlyspoke to me of Sulkowsky in terms of unfeigned sorrow.
“I cannot, ” said he one day, “sufficiently admirethe noble spirit and determined courage of poor Sulkowsky. ” Heoften said that Sulkowsky would have been a valuable aid to whoevermight undertake the resuscitation of Poland. Fortunately that braveofficer was not killed on that occasion, though seriously wounded.He was, however, killed shortly after.
The destruction of the French squadron in the roadsof Aboukir occurred during the absence of the General-in-Chief.This event happened on the 1st of August. The details are generallyknown; but there is one circumstance to which I cannot refrain fromalluding, and which excited deep interest at the time. This was theheroic courage of the son of Casablanca, the captain of the'Orient'. Casablanca was among the wounded, and when the vessel wasblown up his son, a lad of ten years of age, preferred perishingwith him rather than saving himself, when one of the seamen hadsecured him the means of escape. I told the 'aide de camp', sent byGeneral Kleber, who had the command of Alexandria, that theGeneral-in-Chief was near Salehye'h. He proceeded thitherimmediately, and Bonaparte hastened back to Cairo, a distance ofabout thirty-three leagues.
In spite of any assertions that may have been madeto the contrary, the fact is, that as soon as the French troops setfoot in Egypt, they were filled with dissatisfaction, and ardentlylonged to return home. '
— ['Erreurs' objects to this description ofthe complaints of the army, but Savary (tome i. pp. 66, 67, andtome i. p. 89) fully confirms it, giving the reason that the armywas not a homogeneous body, but a mixed force taken from Rome,Florence, Milan, Venice, Genoa, and Marseilles; see also Thiers,tome v. p. 283. But the fact is not singular. For a strikinginstance, in the days of the Empire, of the soldiers in 1809, inSpain, actually threatening Napoleon in his own hearing, see DeGonneville (tome i. pp. 190- 193): “The soldiers of Lapisse'sdivision gave loud expression to the most sinister designs againstthe Emperor's person, stirring up each other to fire a shot at him,sad bandying accusations of cowardice for not doing it. ” He heardit all as plainly as we did, and seemed as if be did not care a bitfor it, but “sent the division into good quarters, when the menwere as enthusiastic as they were formerly mutinous. ” In 1796d'Entraigues, the Bourbon spy, reports, “As a general rule, theFrench soldier grumbles and is discontented. He accuses Bonaparteof being a thief and a rascal. But to-morrow the very same soldierwill obey him blindly” (Iung's Bonaparte, tome iii. p. 152).] —
The illusion of the expedition had disappeared, andonly its reality remained. What bitter murmuring have I not heardfrom Murat, Lannes, Berthier, Bessieres, and others! Theircomplaints were, indeed, often so unmeasured as almost to amount tosedition. This greatly vexed Bonaparte, and drew from him severereproaches and violent language.
— [Napoleon related at St. Helena that in afit of irritation he rushed among a group of dissatisfied generals,and said to one of them, who was remarkable for his stature, “youhave held seditious language; but take care I do not perform myduty. Though you are five feet ten inches high, that shall not saveyou from being shot. ”— Bourrienne. ] —
When the news arrived of the loss of the fleet,discontent increased. All who had acquired fortunes under Napoleonnow began to fear that they would never enjoy them. All turnedtheir thoughts to Paris, and its amusements, and were utterlydisheartened at the idea of being separated from their homes andtheir friends for a period, the termination of which it wasimpossible to foresee.
The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderboltupon the General-in- Chief. In spite of all his energy andfortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which nowassailed him. To the painful feelings excited by the complaints anddejection of his companions in arms was now added the irreparablemisfortune of the burning of our fleet. He measured the fatalconsequences of this event at a single glance. We were now cut offfrom all communication with France, and all hope of returningthither, except by a degrading capitulation with an implacable andhated enemy. Bonaparte had lost all chance of preserving hisconquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection. And atwhat a time did this disaster befall him? At the very moment whenhe was about to apply for the aid of the mother-country.
From what General Bonaparte communicated to mepreviously to the 1st of August, his object was, having oncesecured the possession of Egypt; to return to Toulon with thefleet; then to send troops and provisions of every kind to Egypt;and next to combine with the fleet all the forces that could besupplied, not only by France, but by her allies, for the purpose ofattacking England. It is certain that previously to his departurefor Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note relative to hisplans. He always regarded a descent upon England as possible,though in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior innaval strength; but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure asuperiority on one point.
His intention was to return to France. Availinghimself of the departure of the English fleet for theMediterranean, the alarm excited by his Egyptian expedition, thepanic that would be inspired by his sudden appearance at Boulogne,and his preparations against England, he hoped to oblige that powerto withdraw her naval force from the Mediterranean, and to preventher sending out troops to Egypt. This project was often in hishead. He would have thought it sublime to date an order of the dayfrom the ruins of Memphis, and three months later, one from London.The loss of the fleet converted all these bold conceptions intomere romantic visions.
When alone with me he gave free vent to his emotion.I observed to him that the disaster was doubtless great, but thatit would have been infinitely more irreparable had Nelson fallen inwith us at Malta, or had he waited for us four-and-twenty hoursbefore Alexandria, or in the open sea. “Any one of these events, ”said I, “which were not only possible but probable, would havedeprived us of every resource. We are blockaded here, but we haveprovisions and money. Let us then wait patiently to see what theDirectory will do for us. ”— “The Direc