Feminist Ethics in Film , livre ebook

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96 pages

English

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Popular films can do more than merely entertain us; they can contribute to our understanding of human nature and the ethical theory that informs it. Feminist Ethics in Film explores a varied group of cinematic narratives from the perspective of care-based ethics. The interpersonal relationships they portray disclose important dimensions of care that have been overlooked in less contextualized discussions. In particular, the book examines the relationships between care and community, autonomy, family and self transformation. Interpreting films from the perspective of the feminist ethics of care both expands our knowledge of this burgeoning area of philosophy and adds depth to our appreciation of the films.

Introduction

Saturday Night Fever: Self-Care, Moral Growth and Narrative

Sea Changes: Failure to Care in The Squid and the Whale

The Bonds and Boundaries of Friendship in Friends with Money

From Despair to Care: Self-Transformation in Monster’s Ball

Tuning into Caring Community in Radio

Gandhi: The Ethics of Care in the Nation-State

Conclusion

Sujets

Arts visuels

Cinéma

Cinema

Women's Studies

General officer

History of film

Art

General

Film

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Publié par	Intellect Books Ltd
Date de parution	03 juillet 2012
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9781841506821
Langue	English

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,1250€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

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First published in the UK in 2012 by
Intellect, The Mill, Parnall Road, Fishponds, Bristol, BS16 3JG, UK
First published in the USA in 2012 by
Intellect, The University of Chicago Press, 1427 E. 60th Street,
Chicago, IL 60637, USA
Copyright © 2012 Intellect Ltd
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission.
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
Cover designer: Holly Rose
Copy-editor: MPS Technologies
Production manager: Jelena Stanovnik
Typesetting: Planman Technologies
ISSN 978-1-84150-406-3 eISBN 978-1-84150-682-1
Printed and bound by Hobbs, UK
Contents
Introduction
Saturday Night Fever: Self-Care, Moral Growth and Narrative
Sea Changes: Failure to Care in The Squid and the Whale
The Bonds and Boundaries of Friendship in Friends with Money
From Despair to Care: Self-Transformation in Monster’s Ball
Tuning into Caring Community in Radio
Gandhi: The Ethics of Care in the Nation-State
Conclusion
Index
Introduction
Films can do more than entertain us. They can prompt and sustain philosophical reflection on important aspects of human experience and the ethical theory that is meant to inform it. Of course, we have always had our share of serious cinema that paralleled good literature. Films that shed light on the moral complexities of the human condition in the same way that novels, such as those of Tolstoy and Austen, have long invigorated philosophical analysis of such subjects as betrayal, forgiveness, and love. The depth of well-developed narrative examples furthers reflection on moral life. This book, however, examines the ways in which popular film, rather than art house or foreign cinema, conveys and configures a particular philosophical view—the ethics of care.
The cinematic stories presented in these mass-marketed movies can go beyond providing helpful auxiliaries to philosophical theorizing. As Alasdair MacIntyre persu-asively argues, narrative may be essential for moral understanding. Actions become intelligible only when we can situate intentions and purposes within “a concept of a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative.” 1 The intelligibility of the concept of personhood requires a history, a narrative, within whose structure we can locate the individual responsible for action. And such intelligibility is presupposed by moral philosophy.
The rounded portraits of humanity found in film narrative are even more critical to the ethics of care. It is fair to say that without the concrete quasi-biographies of fiction—of film and literature—the ethics of care is inconsistent with itself or radically incomplete. Recall that care ethics de-emphasizes universal principles in abstraction from particular individuals and the contingencies of their relationships. Because caring is always a response to the needs of particular persons in their determinate circumstances, narrative becomes paramount. Analyzing care in the context of a variety of cinematic stories grounds the philosophy in the concrete lives, relationships, and responses that feminist ethics itself both commends and requires. But before delving into the interplay between film and philosophy, we should review the ethics of care.
The ethics of care
The general orientation of care ethics has been around at least since the sermons of the New Testament. And central tenets of the theory, such as the social nature of the self, have been the mainstay of philosophers from Hegel to Habermas. However, during the past few decades, care ethics has blossomed as a unified approach to moral issues and human flourishing. Under the aegis of feminist philosophy the ethics of care has woven together different strands of theory and moral psychology, and addressed a range of moral issues. The perspective of care arose as an antidote to approaches that took the isolated individual as their starting point and emphasized abstract principles such as those defining justice and rights. For such approaches, obligations arose as a result of the voluntary choices of independent agents, most prevalently in the case of contracts.
Instead, care ethicists focused on interpersonal relationships, stressing the particular individuals in the relationships, their needs and history. Morality turned upon the ability of people to respond to one another’s needs and interests in their contingent circumstances. Many of these relationships are not chosen by the individuals in them, such as those structured by family, work, or community membership. Contrary to the perspective of justice and rights, then, virtues that clustered around personal strength or sufficiency were deflated in the ethics of care. Rather, virtues integral to affiliation and support gained ascendancy; sympathy, attentiveness, and responsiveness came to be considered core features of the attitude of caring. In addition, care takes as its starting point connectedness rather than the separation underlying an ethics of individual rights or justice.
As care ethicists responded to criticism and reevaluations of its basic commitments, several changes occurred. Of particular interest in the present context are the shifts in the scope of the theory and its treatment of autonomy. The first involved expanding the purview of care beyond the intimate spheres of family and friendship. In its early phase, care theory was content to relegate investigation of the public sphere to other ethical views such as Kantianism or Utilitarianism. A division of theoretical labor saw care theorists focus on the complexities of face-to-face relationships, while conceding macro social issues to theories that implemented abstract principles and policies.
More recently, however, philosophers have begun to question, and reject, the view that allocates the public realm to justice while consigning the private domain to care. Feminists and others have argued that questions of justice do indeed arise in the private sphere and that the care perspective is vital to public affairs. Susan Moller Okin, for example, shows why considerations of justice must be brought to bear on the personal interactions of family. She persuasively argues that unless we incorporate considerations of justice into our analysis of the so-called private life of the family, women and children will continue to be oppressed and exploited. 2 Still other ethicists have gone in the opposite direction, applying the care ethics to public policy and practice. Proceeding from the maternal thinking that exemplifies care, Sara Ruddick draws out the implications of the care ethics for international politics, war, and prospects for peace. 3 Grace Clement develops Ruddick’s views on political pacifism, but also proposes a public ethics of care in her investigation of the public funding of long-term provisions for the elderly. 4
Along with the shift that enlarged care ethics to include the social and international arenas, many proponents of care have ceased to regard autonomy as hostile to it. Associating autonomy with the liberal tradition and its emphasis on the isolated, contracting individual, care ethicists initially opposed care to autonomy (as well as to justice and rights). 5 Perhaps because philosophers simply realized that the ability to think and act for oneself is truly valuable in ordinary life, they reconceived autonomy to fit more snugly within the care ethics. Following the social conception of the self, then, feminists reexamined autonomy for its relational aspects. At its most extreme, social relations were said to constitute autonomy. For example, Marilyn Friedman writes that autonomy is “itself [simply] the capacity for a distinctive form of social and, in particular, dialogical engagement.” 6
Such a view seems too strong and overly restrictive since autonomy includes the ability to do many things besides interact socially. For example, autonomy is instrumental in deciding on a career, whom to marry, and how to invest our wealth. Social relations do not exhaust the meaning of autonomy. As we will see, even feminists view autonomy as a set of competencies that are conducive to independence in thought and action, and those competencies are in the possession of individuals—however socially situated they may be. Nevertheless, the emphasis on the tie between personal relationships and autonomy points the discussion in a productive direction. We certainly need to heed the ways in which interpersonal life can both foster and impede an individual’s autonomy.
So, far from being antagonistic to care, autonomy seems essential to establishing and maintaining worthwhile relationships. Grace Clement, for example, notes the importance of autonomy to healthy caring relationships. 7 Only if the members of a friendship, for instance, possess roughly equal autonomy will they be able to function as genuine friends: helping, encouraging, criticizing, and questioning. Unless the relationship is imbued with mutual autonomy, one or more of the individuals in the relationship is liable to be exploited, oppressed, or dependent in a debilitating way.
Although theorists have differed with regard to the details and implications of the relational conception of autonomy, most agree that autonomy begins with a set of competencies. Diana Meyers argues that the autonomous person will have developed “a repertory of skills through which self-discovery, self-definition, and self-direction are achieved.” 8 Inter-subjectivity is relevant even at this basic level of competencies or skills, moreover, because our various relations with other people can be decisive to our range of choice. Caring relationships further our autonomy even as oppressive relationships, such as those driven by racism, obstruct it.
The dependence of autonomy on relationsh