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Cornell University Press - Hal Brands

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289 pages

English

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Grand strategy is one of the most widely used and abused concepts in the foreign policy lexicon. In this important book, Hal Brands explains why grand strategy is a concept that is so alluring-and so elusive-to those who make American statecraft. He explores what grand strategy is, why it is so essential, and why it is so hard to get right amid the turbulence of global affairs and the chaos of domestic politics. At a time when "grand strategy" is very much in vogue, Brands critically appraises just how feasible that endeavor really is.Brands takes a historical approach to this subject, examining how four presidential administrations, from that of Harry S. Truman to that of George W. Bush, sought to "do" grand strategy at key inflection points in the history of modern U.S. foreign policy. As examples ranging from the early Cold War to the Reagan years to the War on Terror demonstrate, grand strategy can be an immensely rewarding undertaking-but also one that is full of potential pitfalls on the long road between conception and implementation. Brands concludes by offering valuable suggestions for how American leaders might approach the challenges of grand strategy in the years to come.

Sujets

History of the Americas

International relations

Informations

Publié par	Cornell University Press
Date de parution	24 janvier 2014
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9780801470288
Langue	English
Poids de l'ouvrage	1 Mo

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,7500€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

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WHAT GOOD IS GRAND STRATEGY?

WHAT GOOD IS RAND STRATEGY?

POWE R AND PURPOSE I N AME RI CAN STAT ECRAFT F ROM HARRY S. T RUMAN TO GEORGE W. BUSH

H a l B r a n d s

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS Ithaca and London

For Emily, Henry, and Annabelle

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 2014 by Cornell University Press

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Brands, Hal, 1983– author. What good is grand strategy? : power and purpose in American statecraft from Harry S. Truman to George W. Bush / Hal Brands. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8014-5246-8 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. United States—Foreign relations—20th century. 2. United States—Foreign relations—21st century I. Title. E744.B6975 2014 327.73009′04—dc23 2013027816

Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly composed of nonwood fibers. For further information, visit our website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.

Cloth printing

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Co nte nts

Preface vii List of Abbreviations and Acronyms xi

Introduction: The Meaning and Challenge of Grand Strategy 1. The Golden Age Revisited: The Truman Administration and the Evolution of Containment 2. Travails of the Heroic Statesmen: Grand Strategy in the Nixon-Kissinger Years 3. Was There a Reagan Grand Strategy? AmericanStatecraftintheLateCold War 4. The Dangers of Being Grand: George W. Bush and the Post-9/11 Era Conclusion: Grappling with Grand Strategy

Notes 207 Index 261

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P r e f a c e

“Grand strategy” is very much in vogue these days. Since the end of the Cold War, politicians and pundits have consistently proclaimed the need for a new American grand strategy, and they have just as consistently flayed their opponents for failing to deliver one. Academics, journalists, and public figures have authored books and articles advocating particular grand strategies for the United States; publications likeNewsweek, theNew York Times,and theWashington Postcarry pieces debating this sub-ject. In 2008, the House Armed Services Committee even held hearings on the topic of “A New Grand Strategy for the United States.” Grand strat-egy has become increasingly prominent on college campuses, too, with elite schools like Yale, Columbia, and Duke all developing programs on the issue. I myself have benefited from this interest: since 2010, I have co-taught Duke’s course on American Grand Strategy. But what exactly is “grand strategy”? Why is it so important and, it would seem, so elusive? Grand strategy, it turns out, is one of the most slippery and widely abused terms in the foreign policy lexicon. The concept is often invoked but less often defined, and those who do define the phrase do so in a variety of different, and often contradictory, ways. Expert observers also disagree on the question of whether grand strategy is a useful concept or simply a quixotic—even pernicious—pursuit. The result of all this is that dis-cussions of grand strategy are often confused or superficial. Too frequently, they muddle or obscure more than they illuminate. The purpose of this book is to grapple with the meaning, importance, and challenges of grand strategy—in other words, to provide a clearer under-standing of what this much-discussed concept is all about. In the chap-ters that follow, I examine why grand strategy is both an essential and an extremely difficult undertaking, one that is central to effective foreign policy but often eludes even the most talented statesmen. I do so primarily through a historical lens, by analyzing the way in which the presidential administra-tions of Harry Truman, Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush have approached grand strategy and the problems it

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entails. Drawing on the experiences of these administrations, I also offer suggestions for how current-day American leaders might think about grand strategy as an intellectual and geopolitical pursuit. In this sense, the book is a work of applied history: it aims not simply to study the past for its own sake, but to use history as a way of illuminating the promise and pitfalls of grand strategy as an endeavor. Accordingly, the remainder of the book proceeds as follows. The intro-duction frames the inquiry by exploring what grand strategy is, and why it is simultaneously so important and so difficult to do. It raises a fundamental question at the heart of this project: Is grand strategy a worthy pursuit for foreign-policy officials, or is it simply a pipe dream that can never actually be realized? Chapters 1 through 4, which constitute the bulk of the book, constitute a historian’s effort to answer this question. Each chapter analyzes the experience of a presidential administration that sought to devise and execute grand strategy at a key moment in modern U.S. foreign policy, and reflects on what these episodes can tell us about the problems and pros-pects of grand strategy writ large. The conclusion distills these insights and offers a set of guidelines for thinking about grand strategy going forward. For all its limitations, grand strategy is ultimately something that is worth doing—and worth doing well. The guidelines proposed in the conclusion represent a way of approaching that challenge in the crucial years ahead. An unfortunate aspect of the academic enterprise is that a book’s acknow-ledgments rarely do justice to the debts that authors accumulate along the way. This project is no exception. In completing this book, I have benefited from the assistance of individuals and institutions whose contributions can only insufficiently be acknowledged here. I could not have managed the research without the help of archivists from Washington, D.C., to Palo Alto, California, nor without the financial and intellectual support of the Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University. Similarly, the Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College sponsored my initial research on Ameri-can grand strategy and provided an outlet for an early monograph on the subject; small portions of the introduction, chapters 1 and 2, and the con-clusion were published in this monograph,The Promise and Pitfalls of Grand StrategyArmy War (Strategic Strategy Institute, 2012). AtCollege, August Cornell University Press, Michael McGandy shepherded the book through the publication process and offered incisive comments along the way. I owe particular gratitude to those scholars whose comments and ideas have influenced—either intentionally or unintentionally—my thinking on the issues at hand. This process started some years ago, when I was fortu-nate enough to be a student in the Studies in Grand Strategy seminar at

PREFACE ix

Yale University, run by John Gaddis, Paul Kennedy, and Charles Hill. Sub-sequent conversations with Barton Bernstein, Adam Grissom, Dick Kohn, Josh Rovner, Jeremi Suri, Kevin Woods, and numerous others helped me develop my views on this subject (though I should add that they will proba-bly disagree with some of the conclusions I have drawn). Williamson Murray, Frank Gavin, Jack Cann, Colin Dueck, and John Deni read all or parts of the manuscript and offered constructive criticism, and John Maurer of the Naval War College invited me to two conferences that helped shape my perspective on teaching and writing about grand strategy. At Duke, Bruce Kuniholm and Bruce Jentleson were very generous with their time and insights, and my students in the American Grand Strategy seminar each fall often made me look at key issues in different ways. And since arriving at Duke, I have had the good fortune to teach that class in cooperation with Peter Feaver—my frequent intellectual sparring partner, and as good a mentor and friend as any young faculty member could hope for. Last but not least, there are Emily, Henry, and Annabelle—my wonderful family, to whom this book is dedicated.