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Publié par
Date de parution
20 septembre 2017
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9781786801494
Langue
English
Publié par
Date de parution
20 septembre 2017
Nombre de lectures
0
EAN13
9781786801494
Langue
English
Reclaiming the State
Reclaiming the State
A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World
William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi
First published 2017 by Pluto Press
345 Archway Road, London N6 5AA
www.plutobooks.com
Copyright William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi 2017
The right of William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN 978 0 7453 3733 3 Hardback
ISBN 978 0 7453 3732 6 Paperback
ISBN 978 1 7868 0148 7 PDF eBook
ISBN 978 1 7868 0150 0 Kindle eBook
ISBN 978 1 7868 0149 4 EPUB eBook
This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. Logging, pulping and manufacturing processes are expected to conform to the environmental standards of the country of origin.
Typeset by Stanford DTP Services, Northampton, England
Simultaneously printed in the United Kingdom and United States of America
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction: Make the Left Great Again
PART I The Great Transformation Redux: From Keynesianism to Neoliberalism - and Beyond
1. Broken Paradise: A Critical Assessment of the Keynesian Full Employment Era
2. Destined to Fail: Understanding the Crisis of Keynesianism and the Rise of Neoliberalism
3. That Option No Longer Exists: How Britain, and the British Labour Party, Fell Into the Monetarist Trap
4. The Paris Consensus: The French Left and the Creation of Neoliberal Europe
5. The State Never Went Away: Neoliberalism as a State-Driven Project
6. Apr s Elle, Le D luge : Are We Entering a Post-Neoliberal Age?
PART II A Progressive Strategy for the Twenty-First Century
7. Towards a Progressive Vision of Sovereignty
8. A Government is Not Like a Household: An Introduction to Modern Monetary Theory
9. I Have a Job For You: Why a Job Guarantee is Better than a Basic Income
10. We Have a (Central) Plan: The Case of Renationalisation
Conclusion: Back to the State
Notes
Index
Acknowledgements
Both authors would like to specially acknowledge the valuable administrative and editorial assistance they received from Melinda Hannan (at CofFEE). Thomas Fazi would also like to thank Cristina for her love and patience.
The overall project is dedicated however to the millions of nameless unemployed workers who have been denied the opportunity to live fulfilled lives by the implementation of neoliberal economic policies abetted by orthodox economists who, unfortunately, bear none of the costs of their folly.
While many have offered help and advice, all errors remain the responsibility of the authors.
Introduction: Make the Left Great Again
The West is currently in the midst of an anti-establishment revolt of historic proportions.
The Brexit vote in the United Kingdom, the election of Donald Trump in the United States, the rejection of Matteo Renzi s neoliberal constitutional reform in Italy, the EU s unprecedented crisis of legitimation: although these interrelated phenomena differ in ideology and goals, they are all rejections of the (neo)liberal order that has dominated the world - and in particular the West - for the past 30 years.
Even though the system has thus proven capable (for the most part) of absorbing and neutralising these electoral uprisings, 1 there is no indication that this anti-establishment revolt is going to abate any time soon. Support for anti-establishment parties in the developed world is at the highest level since the 1930s - and growing. 2 At the same time, support for mainstream parties - including traditional social-democratic parties - has collapsed.
The reasons for this backlash are rather obvious. The financial crisis of 2007-9 laid bare the scorched earth left behind by neoliberalism, which the elites had gone to great lengths to conceal, in both material (financialisation) and ideological ( the end of history ) terms. As credit dried up, it became apparent that for years the economy had continued to grow primarily because banks were distributing the purchasing power - through debt - that businesses were not providing in salaries. To paraphrase Warren Buffett, the receding tide of the debt-fuelled boom revealed that most people were, in fact, swimming naked.
The situation was (is) further exacerbated by the post-crisis policies of fiscal austerity and wage deflation pursued by a number of Western governments, particularly in Europe, which saw the financial crisis as an opportunity to impose an even more radical neoliberal regime and to push through policies designed to suit the financial sector and the wealthy, at the expense of everyone else. Thus, the unfinished agenda of privatisation, deregulation and welfare state retrenchment - temporarily interrupted by the financial crisis - was reinstated with even greater vigour.
Amid growing popular dissatisfaction, social unrest and mass unemployment (in a number of European countries), political elites on both sides of the Atlantic responded with business-as-usual policies and discourses. As a result, the social contract binding citizens to traditional ruling parties is more strained today than at any other time since World War II - and in some countries has arguably already been broken.
Of course, even if we limit the scope of our analysis to the post-war period, anti-systemic movements and parties are not new in the West. Up until the 1980s, anti-capitalism remained a major force to be reckoned with. The novelty is that today - unlike 20, 30 or 40 years ago - it is movements and parties of the right and extreme right (along with new parties of the neoliberal extreme centre , such as the new French president Emmanuel Macron s party En Marche!) that are leading the revolt, far outweighing the movements and parties of the left in terms of voting strength and opinion-shaping. With few exceptions, left parties - that is, parties to the left of traditional social-democratic parties - are relegated to the margins of the political spectrum in most countries. Meanwhile, in Europe, traditional social-democratic parties are being pasokified - that is, reduced to parliamentary insignificance, like many of their centre-right counterparts, due to their embrace of neoliberalism and failure to offer a meaningful alternative to the status quo - in one country after another. The term refers to the Greek social-democratic party PASOK, which was virtually wiped out of existence in 2014, due to its inane handling of the Greek debt crisis, after dominating the Greek political scene for more than three decades. A similar fate has befallen other former behemoths of the social-democratic establishment, such as the French Socialist Party and the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA). Support for social-democratic parties is today at the lowest level in 70 years - and falling. 3
How should we explain the decline of the left - not just the electoral decline of those parties that are commonly associated with the left side of the political spectrum, regardless of their effective political orientation, but also the decline of core left values within those parties and within society in general? Why has the anti-establishment left proven unable to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the establishment left? More broadly, how did the left come to count so little in global politics? Can the left, both culturally and politically, become a major force in our societies again? And if so, how? These are some of the questions that we attempt to answer in this book.
Though the left has been making inroads in some countries in recent years - notable examples include Bernie Sanders in the United States, Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, Podemos in Spain and Jean-Luc M lenchon in France - and has even succeeded in taking power in Greece (though the SYRIZA government was rapidly brought to heel by the European establishment), there is no denying that, for the most part, movements and parties of the extreme right have been more effective than left-wing or progressive forces at tapping into the legitimate grievances of the masses - disenfranchised, marginalised, impoverished and dispossessed by the 40-year-long neoliberal class war waged from above. In particular, they are the only forces that have been able to provide a (more or less) coherent response to the widespread - and growing - yearning for greater territorial or national sovereignty, increasingly seen as the only way, in the absence of effective supranational mechanisms of representation, to regain some degree of collective control over politics and society, and in particular over the flows of capital, trade and people that constitute the essence of neoliberal globalisation.
Given neoliberalism s war against sovereignty, it should come as no surprise that sovereignty has become the master-frame of contemporary politics , as Paolo Gerbaudo notes. 4 After all, as we argue in Chapter 5, the hollowing out of national sovereignty and curtailment of popular-democratic mechanisms - what has been termed depoliticisation - has been an essential element of the neoliberal project, aimed at insulating macroeconomic policies from popular contestation and removing any obstacles put in the way of economic exchanges and financial flows. Given the nefarious effects of depoliticisation, it is only natural that the revolt against neoliberalism should first and foremost take the form of demands for a repoliticisation of national decision-making processes.
The fact that the vision of national sovereignty that was at the centre of the Trump and Brexit campaigns, and that currently dominates the public discourse, is a reactionary, quasi-fascist one - mostly defined along ethnic, exclusivist and authoritarian lines - should not be seen as an indictment of national sovereignty as such . History att