In First Do No Harm, David Gibbs raises basic questions about the humanitarian interventions that have played a key role in U.S. foreign policy for the past twenty years. Using a wide range of sources, including government documents, transcripts of international war crimes trials, and memoirs, Gibbs shows how these interventions often heightened violence and increased human suffering.
The book focuses on the 1991-99 breakup of Yugoslavia, which helped forge the idea that the United States and its allies could stage humanitarian interventions that would end ethnic strife. It is widely believed that NATO bombing campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo played a vital role in stopping Serb-directed aggression, and thus resolving the conflict.
Gibbs challenges this view, offering an extended critique of Samantha Power's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide. He shows that intervention contributed to the initial breakup of Yugoslavia, and then helped spread the violence and destruction. Gibbs also explains how the motives for U.S. intervention were rooted in its struggle for continued hegemony in Europe.
First Do No Harm argues for a new, noninterventionist model for U.S. foreign policy, one that deploys nonmilitary methods for addressing ethnic violence.
his book is printed on acid-free paper made from % post-consumer recycled content. Manufactured in te United States of America
Frontispiece: Based on “he Former Yugoslavia” (map) from te United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Cartograpic Section.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gibbs, David N. First do no arm : umanitarian intervention and te destruction of Yugoslavia / David N. Gibbs. p. cm. Includes bibliograpical references and index. ISBN 8--8-- (clot : alk. paper) ISBN 8--8-- (pbk. : alk. paper) . Humanitarian intervention—Bosnia and Hercegovina. . Humanitarian intervention—Serbia—Kosovo. . Yugoslav War, –—Participation, Foreign. . Kosovo (Serbia)—History—Civil War, 8–—Participation, Foreign. . United States—Foreign relations—Yugoslavia. . Yugoslavia—Foreign relations—United States. I. Title. JZ.G .—dc 8
For Diana and Natan
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Contents
Preface
he Rise of Humanitarian Intervention US Predominance and te Logic of Interventionism Origins of te Yugoslav Conflict Germany Drops a Matc he War Spreads to Bosnia-Herzegovina Only te Weak Rely on Diplomacy: he Clinton Administration Faces Bosnia Kosovo and te Reaffirmation of American Power Conclusion
Notes Bibliograpy Index
ix
1
16
45
76
106
141
171
205
223
309
335
Preface
his book is te product of my long-standing interest in foreign interven-tion. As I grew up during te s and s, te unfolding disaster of US intervention in Vietnam sparked my interest in tis topic. I remember well wen I eard in te first details of te My Lai massacre and was dis-turbed to realize tat US troops were capable of suc actions. I was similarly saken by te effects of US bombing, te use of cemical weapons, and te advent of “free fire” zones, among oter orrors of tat war. Wat impressed me even more was te extent to wic official lies and deceptions elped to justify te war and to mislead te public (a point underscored by te pub-lication of tePentagon Papersin , wen I was tirteen). As a graduate student and a young professor, I pursued tese interests in extended studies of foreign interventions in te Congo Crisis of te early s, and ten in Afganistan after 8. I am tus writing from a position tat is fundamentally skeptical about te merits of intervention and, to some extent, of war more generally. I agree tat tere ave been a andful of wars tat produced positive results (and yes, US involvement in World War II was one suc example). But I would see tese “positive” cases as rare. In most instances, te legacy of military intervention as been appalling, and I ave found noting in my studies of Yugoslavia to callenge tis basic assumption. Anoter influence on tis book as been te continuation of US mili-tarism following te demise of te USSR. he basic paradox was succinctly stated by Calmers Jonson in a recent interview:
In 8, Mikail Gorbacev makes a decision. [He] could ave stopped te Germans from tearing down te Berlin Wall, but [instead] . . . e just watces tem tear it down and, at once, te wole Soviet empire starts to unravel. . . . [W ]at startled me almost more tan te Wall coming down