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173 pages

English

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The classic liberal philosopher of nineteenth century England, John Stuart Mill, used Considerations on Representative Government to call for reforms to Parliament and voting, calling for proportional representation, the Single Transferable Vote, and the extension of suffrage. Mill was a renowned political theorist and economist, a Member of Parliament, and one of the greatest advocates utilitarianism.

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Publié par	The Floating Press
Date de parution	01 mai 2009
Nombre de lectures	0
EAN13	9781775410621
Langue	English

Informations légales : prix de location à la page 0,0164€. Cette information est donnée uniquement à titre indicatif conformément à la législation en vigueur.

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CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
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JOHN STUART MILL

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Considerations on Representative Government First published in 1861.
ISBN 978-1-775410-62-1
© 2009 THE FLOATING PRESS.
While every effort has been used to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information contained in The Floating Press edition of this book, The Floating Press does not assume liability or responsibility for any errors or omissions in this book. The Floating Press does not accept responsibility for loss suffered as a result of reliance upon the accuracy or currency of information contained in this book. Do not use while operating a motor vehicle or heavy equipment. Many suitcases look alike.
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Contents
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Preface Chapter I - To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice Chapter II - The Criterion of a Good Form of Government Chapter III - That the Ideally Best Form of Government is Representative Government Chapter IV - Under What Social Conditions Representative Government is Inapplicable Chapter V - Of the Proper Functions of Representative Bodies Chapter VI - Of the Infirmities and Dangers to Which Representative Governmentis Liable Chapter VII - Of True and False Democracy; Representation of All, and Representationof the Majority Only Chapter VIII - Of the Extension of the Suffrage Chapter IX - Should there Be Two Stages of Election? Chapter X - Of the Mode of Voting Chapter XI - Of the Duration of Parliaments Chapter XII - Ought Pledges to Be Required from Members of Parliament? Chapter XIII - Of a Second Chamber Chapter XIV - Of the Executive in a Representative Government Chapter XV - Of Local Representative Bodies Chapter XVI - Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government Chapter XVII - Of Federal Representative Governments Chapter XVIII - Of the Government of Dependencies by a Free State Endnotes
Preface
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Those who have done me the honor of reading my previous writings willprobably receive no strong impression of novelty from the presentvolume; for the principles are those to which I have been working upduring the greater part of my life, and most of the practicalsuggestions have been anticipated by others or by myself. There isnovelty, however, in the fact of bringing them together, andexhibiting them in their connection, and also, I believe, in much thatis brought forward in their support. Several of the opinions at allevents, if not new, are for the present as little likely to meet withgeneral acceptance as if they were.
It seems to me, however, from various indications, and from none morethan the recent debates on Reform of Parliament, that bothConservatives and Liberals (if I may continue to call them what theystill call themselves) have lost confidence in the political creedswhich they nominally profess, while neither side appears to have madeany progress in providing itself with a better. Yet such a betterdoctrine must be possible; not a mere compromise, by splitting thedifference between the two, but something wider than either, which, invirtue of its superior comprehensiveness, might be adopted by eitherLiberal or Conservative without renouncing any thing which he reallyfeels to be valuable in his own creed. When so many feel obscurely thewant of such a doctrine, and so few even flatter themselves that theyhave attained it, any one may without presumption, offer what his ownthoughts, and the best that he knows of those of others, are able tocontribute towards its formation.
Chapter I - To What Extent Forms of Government Are a Matter of Choice
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All speculations concerning forms of government bear the impress, moreor less exclusive, of two conflicting theories respecting politicalinstitutions; or, to speak more properly, conflicting conceptions ofwhat political institutions are.
By some minds, government is conceived as strictly a practical art,giving rise to no questions but those of means and an end. Forms ofgovernment are assimilated to any other expedients for the attainmentof human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of inventionand contrivance. Being made by man, it is assumed that man has thechoice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern theyshall be made. Government, according to this conception, is a problem,to be worked like any other question of business. The first step is todefine the purposes which governments are required to promote. Thenext, is to inquire what form of government is best fitted to fulfillthose purposes. Having satisfied ourselves on these two points, andascertained the form of government which combines the greatest amountof good with the least of evil, what further remains is to obtain theconcurrence of our countrymen, or those for whom the institutions areintended, in the opinion which we have privately arrived at. To findthe best form of government; to persuade others that it is the best;and, having done so, to stir them up to insist on having it, is theorder of ideas in the minds of those who adopt this view of politicalphilosophy. They look upon a constitution in the same light(difference of scale being allowed for) as they would upon a steamplow, or a threshing machine.
To these stand opposed another kind of political reasoners, who are sofar from assimilating a form of government to a machine, that theyregard it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the science ofgovernment as a branch (so to speak) of natural history. According tothem, forms of government are not a matter of choice. We must takethem, in the main, as we find them. Governments can not be constructedby premeditated design. They "are not made, but grow." Our businesswith them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaintourselves with their natural properties, and adapt ourselves to them.The fundamental political institutions of a people are considered bythis school as a sort of organic growth from the nature and life ofthat people; a product of their habits, instincts, and unconsciouswants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate purposes. Theirwill has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessitiesof the moment by the contrivances of the moment, which contrivances,if in sufficient conformity to the national feelings and character,commonly last, and, by successive aggregation, constitute a politysuited to the people who possess it, but which it would be vain toattempt to superinduce upon any people whose nature and circumstanceshad not spontaneously evolved it.
It is difficult to decide which of these doctrines would be the mostabsurd, if we could suppose either of them held as an exclusivetheory. But the principles which men profess, on any controvertedsubject, are usually a very incomplete exponent of the opinions theyreally hold. No one believes that every people is capable of workingevery sort of institution. Carry the analogy of mechanicalcontrivances as far as we will, a man does not choose even aninstrument of timber and iron on the sole ground that it is in itselfthe best. He considers whether he possesses the other requisites whichmust be combined with it to render its employment advantageous, and,in particular whether those by whom it will have to be worked possessthe knowledge and skill necessary for its management. On the otherhand, neither are those who speak of institutions as if they were akind of living organisms really the political fatalists they givethemselves out to be. They do not pretend that mankind have absolutelyno range of choice as to the government they will live under, or thata consideration of the consequences which flow from different forms ofpolity is no element at all in deciding which of them should bepreferred. But, though each side greatly exaggerates its own theory,out of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modificationto either, the two doctrines correspond to a deep-seated differencebetween two modes of thought; and though it is evident that neither ofthese is entirely in the right, yet it being equally evident thatneither is wholly in the wrong, we must endeavour to get down to whatis at the root of each, and avail ourselves of the amount of truthwhich exists in either.
Let us remember, then, in the first place, that political institutions(however the proposition may be at times ignored) are the work ofmen—owe their origin and their whole existence to human will. Men didnot wake on a summer morning and find them sprung up. Neither do theyresemble trees, which, once planted, "are aye growing" while men "aresleeping." In every stage of their existence they are made what theyare by human voluntary agency. Like all things, therefore, which aremade by men, they may be either well or ill made; judgment and skillmay have been exercised in their production, or the reverse of these.And again, if a people have omitted, or from outward pressure have nothad it in their power to give themselves a constitution by thetentative process of applying a corrective to each evil as it arose,or as the sufferers gained strength to resist it, this retardation ofpolitical progress is no doubt a great disadvantage to them, but itdoes not prove that what has been found good for others would not havebeen good also for them, and will not be so still when they think fitto adopt it.
On the other hand, it is also to be borne in mind that politicalmachinery does not act of itself. As it is first made, so it has to beworked, by men, and even by ordinary men. It needs, not their simpleacquiescence, but their active participation; and must be adjusted tothe capacities and qualities of such men as are available. Thisimplies three conditions. The people for whom the form of governmentis intended must be willing to accept it, or, at least not sounwilling as to oppose an insurmountable obstacle to itsestablishment. They must be willing and able to do what is necessaryto keep it standing. And they must be willing and able to do what itrequires of them