Some Principles of Maritime Strategy

nishug - Julian S. (Julian Stafford) Corbett

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Publié par	nishug
Publié le	08 décembre 2010
Nombre de lectures	30
Langue	English

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The Project Gutenberg eBook, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, by Julian Stafford Corbett This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net Title: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy Author: Julian Stafford Corbett Release Date: February 16, 2005 [eBook #15076] Language: english Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 ***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME STRATEGY*** E-text prepared by Suzanne Shell, Keith Edkins, and the Project Gutenberg Online Distributed Proofreading Team Some principles of maritime strategy Sir Julian Corbett (courtesy D.M. Schurman) LONDON 1911. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION THE THEORETICAL STUDY OF WAR—ITS USE AND LIMITATIONS 3 PART I. THEORY OF WAR I. THE THEORY OF WAR II. NATURES OF WARS—OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE III. NATURES OF WARS—LIMITED AND UNLIMITED IV. LIMITED WAR AND MARITIME EMPIRES V. WARS OF INTERVENTION—LIMITED INTERFERENCE IN UNLIMITED WAR VI. CONDITIONS OF STRENGTH IN LIMITED WAR 15 31 41 52 60 72 PART II. THEORY OF NAVAL WAR I. THEORY OF THE OBJECT—COMMAND OF THE SEA II. THEORY OF THE MEANS—THE CONSTITUTION OF FLEETS III. THEORY OF THE METHOD—CONCENTRATION AND DISPERSAL OF FORCE 91 107 128 [pg 2] PART III. CONDUCT OF NAVAL WAR I. INTRODUCTORY— 155 1. INHERENT DIFFERENCES IN THE CONDITIONS OF WAR ON LAND AND ON SEA 155 2. TYPICAL FORMS OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 161 II. METHODS OF SECURING COMMAND— 167 1. ON OBTAINING A DECISION 167 2. BLOCKADE 183 III. METHODS OF DISPUTING COMMAND— 209 1. DEFENSIVE FLEET OPERATIONS—"A FLEET IN BEING" 209 2. MINOR COUNTER-ATTACKS 227 IV. METHODS OF EXERCISING COMMAND— 233 1. DEFENCE AGAINST INVASION 233 2. ATTACK AND DEFENCE OF TRADE 261 3. ATTACK, DEFENCE, AND SUPPORT OF MILITARY EXPEDITIONS 280 Appendix: The "Green Pamphlet" INDEX 305 346 [pg 3] INTRODUCTION The Theoretical Study of War—Its Use and Limitations At first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. There seems indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful conduct of war. The conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and evershifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific analysis. At the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as leaders. Yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. Still less will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers. The truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. It does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective power of [pg 4] conduct. Its main practical value is that it can assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. The greatest of the theorists himself puts the matter quite frankly. Of theoretical study he says, "It should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or rather guide him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on the field of battle." Its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined to its effects upon the powers of a leader. It is not enough that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in well-adjusted action. For this every man concerned must have been trained to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the same process of thought; his words must have the same meaning for all. If a theory of tactics had existed in 1780, and if Captain Carkett had had a sound training in such a theory, he could not possibly have misunderstood Rodney's signal. As it was, the real intention of the signal was obscure, and Rodney's neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed his country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. There had been no previous theoretical training to supply the omission, and Rodney's fine conception was unintelligible to anybody but himself. Nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a chief and his subordinates that theory is indispensable. It is of still higher value for producing a similar solidarity between him and his superiors at the Council table at home. How often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to convince an impatient Minister where the errors of his plan lay? How often, moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability to analyse scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognise the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage. That the true nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is seldom to be expected. At close range accidental factors will force themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. Such error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. Theory is, in fact, a question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. That depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call executive ability. This, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for theory, but to this claim the chief of them at least, after years of active service on the Staff, attached the highest importance. "In actual operations," he wrote in one

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