Tet Offensive , livre ebook

The Tet Offensive
INTELLIGENCE FAILURE IN WAR
J AMES J. W IRTZ
Cornell University Press
I THACA AND L ONDON
Contents Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction P ART I: “T HE B IG V ICTORY , T HE G REAT T ASK ” 1. The Communist Debate over Strategy 2. Plans, Preparations, and Objectives of the Tet Offensive P ART II: T HE O RIGINS OF S URPRISE 3. The Sources of American Biases 4. Missing the Signals: July–November 1967 5. Missing the Signals: December 1967–30 January 1968 6. Reacting to the Tet Offensive Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Bibliography
Acknowledgments
Many individuals and organizations have eased the task of preparing this manuscript. Robert Jervis, Richard Betts, Warner Schilling, Jack Snyder, and Robert Art not only provided comments that significantly improved the quality of this work but also served as fine examples of how one approaches the discipline of political science. Jervis and Betts often went beyond the call of duty in providing both encouragement and help in securing the resources needed to undertake the project.
I am indebted especially to Samuel P. Huntington, the John M. Olin Foundation, and the staff of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University for providing the perfect research environment. By supplying funding for the 1985 and 1986 academic years and eight weeks of summer research, the Olin Foundation greatly facilitated the completion of this project. Sam Huntington deserves special praise for taking a keen interest in the pre-doctoral fellows at the CFIA and for creating a setting conducive to research and intellectual growth.
While I was at the CFIA, Tom Fintel, Ira Klein, Timothy Lomperis, Douglas Macdonald, and Edward Rhodes were kind enough to read first drafts of many chapters; they caught several silly mistakes before they could cause me embarrassment. Even after the end of our days at the CFIA, Lomperis, Macdonald, and Rhodes continued to read chapters and to encourage me. Michael Handel and Richard Valcourt, who both share my interest in intelligence analysis, also provided encouragement and advice. Additionally, I thank George Allen, Walt Rostow, and Robert Ruhl Simmons for offering insights into several key events during the war. I also benefited from Glenn Palmer’s comments on several chapters.
I thank the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation for a grant that al lowed me to use the documents maintained at the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas. David Humphrey was a masterful guide to the materials on the Vietnam War maintained at the library. His help allowed me to compress months of research into a matter of weeks. Similarly, I am grateful to Stephen Eldridge of the Department of the Army, who guided me through the records maintained by the Department of the Army and the National Archives. Both men showed extreme patience in the face of naive questions.
As the manuscript reached its final stages, I benefited greatly from the computer support offered by Robert Friedrich. I thank Holly Baily, Patty Peltekos, and Kathleen Moschak at Cornell University Press for their assistance. They were kind to a first-time author, and their efforts greatly improved the manuscript.
My parents, Charles John Wirtz and Elizabeth Goffa Wirtz, and my sister, Mary Elise Wirtz, deserve a special note of thanks since they continue to support me in my decision to pursue an academic career. By bearing more than their share of my financial and emotional burdens, my parents greatly eased the task of preparing this manuscript in its initial stages.
Finally, I thank my wife, Janet Ayden Wirtz. Not only did she help me in a thousand different ways, she directly contributed to the completion of the work by painstakingly proofreading the manuscript. Her confidence in my abilities never wavered, and for this I am truly grateful.
J AMES J. W IRTZ
Monterey, California
Abbreviations
ARVN
Army of the Republic of [South] Vietnam CDEC Combined Document Exploitation Center (allies) CIA Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.) CICV Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam (allies) CIDG civilian irregular defense group (allies) CINCPAC Commander in Chief, Pacific (U.S.) CMD Capital Military District (RVN) CMEC Combined Material Exploitation Center (allies) CMIC Combined Military Interrogation Center (allies) CMR Capital Military Region COMUSMACV Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam CORDS Civilian Operations and Rural Development Support COSVN Central Office [Communist party] for South Vietnam CTZ corps tactical zone DIA Defense Intelligence Agency (U.S.) DMZ demilitarized zone FFV Field Force, Vietnam (U.S.) FWMAF Free World Military Assistance Forces (allies) GVN government of [South] Vietnam J-2 military intelligence staff JGS Joint General Staff (RVN) LOC lines of communication MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam MAF Marine Amphibious Force (U.S.) NVA North Vietnamese Army NIE National Intelligence Estimate (U.S.) NLF National Liberation Front NSA National Security Agency (U.S.) NVN North Vietnam PERINTREP Periodic Intelligence Report (CICV) PRP People’s Revolutionary party RD Rural Development [pacification] program (RVN) RVN Republic of [South] Vietnam RVNAF Republic of [South] Vietnam Armed Forces SAC Strategic Air Command (U.S.) SIGINT [electronic] signals intelligence SVN South Vietnam USARV U.S. Army, Vietnam VC Vietcong VDRN Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes VWP Vietnamese Worker’s [Communist] party
Introduction
On 31 January 1968, during the Tet holiday, communist forces simultaneously attacked urban areas, military installations, and government facilities throughout South Vietnam. By the time the offensive’s intensity began to wane on 13 February, 1100 Americans had been killed in action, and members of the Johnson administration and the American public had been stunned by the fury of the Tet attacks. Following the offensive, the official U.S. government investigation into the circumstances surrounding the Tet attacks concluded that, “although warning had . . . been provided, the intensity, coordination, and timing of the enemy attack were not fully anticipated.” 1 U.S. and South Vietnamese officers and intelligence analysts failed to anticipate the nature of the Tet offensive. This failure not only contributed to the initial military gains enjoyed by the communists but also increased the shock produced by the attack. Ultimately, it was the surprise, not the short-term military advantages, that reduced the willingness of the American public and political elite to continue to prosecute the war in Vietnam. 2
The Tet offensive was the decisive battle of the Vietnam War because of its profound impact on American attitudes about involvement in Southeast Asia. In the aftermath of Tet, many Americans became disillusioned with the Johnson administration’s conduct of the war. To the American public and even to members of the admin istration, the offensive demonstrated that U.S. intervention in the ground war had produced a negligible effect on the will and capability of the Vietcong and North Vietnamese to continue in their struggle to unite Vietnam. The Tet offensive seemed to indicate to most observers that the three years of “big-unit war” that followed the deployment of U.S. ground forces in 1965 had produced only a steady stream of casualties on all sides. On the battlefield, Tet marked the turning point between U.S. escalation and withdrawal from the war.
In the realm of domestic politics, the consequences of the offensive were also profound. Tet discredited the Johnson administration, reinforcing the president’s decision not to run for reelection. For many Americans, Tet enhanced the credibility gap between the electorate and government officials as battlefield developments apparently contradicted the claims of progress in the war made by the Johnson administration and the military. The offensive turned disengagement from the struggle in Vietnam into the American political priority for the next five years. Over the longer term, Tet marked the beginning of what Ronald Reagan called the “Vietnam syndrome”: a period of public disillusionment with military intervention, defense spending, and an active anticommunist approach to foreign affairs. In a sense, the Tet offensive quelled the crusading spirit that characterized America’s postwar rush to intervene in conflicts in the Third World.
Given the political impact of the Tet attacks, it would be logical to assume that the offensive dealt a devastating military setback to U.S. forces and their South Vietnamese allies. Dire consequences usually follow a disastrous defeat. Ironically, the allies defeated the communists decisively during Tet. From the communist perspective, the offensive was a gamble, even a desperate gamble, taken to offset the overwhelming resources, mobility, firepower, technological sophistication, and professionalism of their opponent. The North Vietnamese and Vietcong hoped that the attacks would foster a revolt of the southern population against the government, thereby adding tens of thousands of combatants to the communist side. When the offensive failed to spark this insurrection, communist commanders lacked the resources needed to attain their ambitious objectives, and the allies defeated their widely scattered forces piecemeal. Even though the Tet attacks failed to unfold as planned, the offensive eventually produced the outcome desired by the communists.
The communists intended the surprise inflicted against the allies during Tet. They adopted a sophisticated strategy of deception, misleading their opponents about their intentions in a quest to eliminate or reduce the effectiveness of responses to the offensive. In wartime, the active or passive effort to mislead, misinform, or confuse an opponent about one’s capabilities or intentions can take several forms. A nation contemplating an attack can try to make its adversary locate its forces in the wrong place. In suc