Three essays on efficiency and incentives in teams and partnerships [Elektronische Ressource] / von Jianpei Li

Three essays on Efficiency andIncentives in Teams and PartnershipsDISSERTATIONzur Erlangung des akademischen Gradesdoctor rerum politicarum(Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaft)eingereicht an derWirtschaftswissenschaften Fakultätder Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinvonFrau M.A. Jianpei Ligeboren am 02.06.1975, Henan, V.R.ChinaPräsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin:Prof. Dr. Christoph MarkschiesDekan der Wirtschaftswissenschaften Fakultät:Prof. Oliver Günther, Ph. D.Gutachter:1. Prof. Dr. Elmar Wolfstetter2. Prof. Dr. Ulrich KameckeTag der Kolloquiums: 22 November 2007AbstractClassic economic theory claims that teams and partnerships are inflicted with free–riding incentives and are inferior to capitalist firms in eliciting proper actions fromplayers. This contradicts the popularity of teams and partnerships as organizationforms.By accounting for several factors that may significantly affect effort provision (in-vestment) but have been generally neglected in the literature: 1) tournament effectwithin teams; 2) other–regarding preferences; 3) possible dissolution of a partnership,this dissertation shows that teams and partnerships are not handicapped organizationforms. Whether efficient efforts provision (investment) is achieved or not depends crit-ically on the mechanisms employed in the allocation of team output and dissolutionof a partnership.