State aid and competition policy [Elektronische Ressource] : the case of bailouts in the European Union / von Elżbieta Głowicka

StateAidandCompetitionPolicy: TheCaseofBailoutsintheEuropeanUnionDISSERTATIONzurErlangungdesakademischenGradesdoctorrerumpoliticarum(Dr. rer. pol.)imFachVolkswirtschaftslehreeingereichtanderWirtschaftswissenschaftlichenFakultätHumboldt UniversitätzuBerlinvon˙MagisterEkonomiiiMatematykiElzbietaGłowickageborenam03.02.1977inTarnogród,PolenPräsidentderHumboldt UniversitätzuBerlin:Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c. ChristophMarkschiesDekanderWirtschaftswissenschaftlichenFakultät:Prof. OliverGünther,Ph.D.Gutachter:1. Prof. Lars HendrikRöller,Ph.D.2. Prof. Dr. FranzHuberteingereichtam: 8April2008TagdermündlichenPrüfung: 8Mai2008AbstractGovernmentsintheEuropeanUnionfrequentlybailoutfirmsindistressbygrantingstateaid called Rescue and Restructuring Subsidies. This thesis consists of three chaptersanalyzingthreedifferentaspectsofEuropeanbailouts.Inthefirstchapter,Iusedatafrom86casesduringtheyears1995 2003toexaminetheeffectivenessofbailoutsinpreventingbankruptcyandthedeterminantsofbailoutpolicy.The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete time hazard rate increases duringthe first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailoutsonlydelayedexitinsteadofpreventingit. Second,governments’bailoutdecisionsfavoredstate owned firms, even though state owned firms did not outperform private ones in thesurvival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable in the analysis ofthe hazard rate.