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120
pages
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English
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Documents
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2006
Description
Contents1 Introduction 1I Political Economy in Open Economies 62 National Policies in International Markets 72.1 Policy Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72.2 International Cooperation and Welfare Maximizing Politicians . . . . . 92.3 TimeConsistencyandCredibility: InternationalCompetitionasaCom-mitment Device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.4 Biased Politicians: Cooperation as a Means of Collusion . . . . . . . . 132.5 Enforcement and Institutions: The Role of International Organizations 152.6 Domestic Institutions and International Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172.7 Conclusion and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device - A Probabilistic VotingModel of Sovereign Debt 203.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223.2.1 Market Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233.2.2 Political Structure - Probabilistic Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243.3 Positive Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293.4 Normative Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361CONTENTS 23.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Publié par
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Publié le
01 janvier 2006
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Langue
English