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5
pages
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English
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Documents
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2007
Description
From the book : Evolutionary Psychology 5 issue 1 : 47-51.
I evaluate the use of the byproduct concept in psychology, particularly the adaptation–byproduct distinction that is commonly invoked in discussions of psychological phenomena.
This distinction can be problematic when investigating algorithmic mechanisms and their effects, because although all byproducts may be functionless concomitants of adaptations, not all incidental effects of algorithmic adaptations are byproducts (although they have sometimes been labeled as such).
I call attention to Sperber’s (1994) distinction between proper domains and actual domains of algorithmic mechanisms.
Extending Sperber’s distinction, I propose the terms adaptive effects and non-adaptive effects, which more accurately capture the phenomena of interest to psychologists and prevent fruitless adaptation-versus-byproduct debates.
I evaluate the use of the byproduct concept in psychology, particularly the adaptation–byproduct distinction that is commonly invoked in discussions of psychological phenomena.
This distinction can be problematic when investigating algorithmic mechanisms and their effects, because although all byproducts may be functionless concomitants of adaptations, not all incidental effects of algorithmic adaptations are byproducts (although they have sometimes been labeled as such).
I call attention to Sperber’s (1994) distinction between proper domains and actual domains of algorithmic mechanisms.
Extending Sperber’s distinction, I propose the terms adaptive effects and non-adaptive effects, which more accurately capture the phenomena of interest to psychologists and prevent fruitless adaptation-versus-byproduct debates.
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Publié par
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Publié le
01 janvier 2007
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Licence :
Paternité, pas d'utilisation commerciale, partage des conditions initiales à l'identique -
Langue
English