-
28
pages
-
English
-
Documents
-
2003
Description
From the book : Evolutionary Psychology 1: 42-69.
Altruism is difficult to explain evolutionarily if subtle cheaters exist in a population (Trivers, 1971).
A pathway to the evolutionary maintenance of cooperation is nonverbal altruist-detection.
One adaptive advantage of nonverbal altruist-detection is the formation of trustworthy division of labour partnerships (Frank, 1988).
Three studies were designed to test a fundamental assumption behind altruistic partner preference models.
In the first experiment perceivers (blind with respect to target altruism level) made assessments of video-clips depicting self-reported altruists and self-reported non-altruists.
Video-clips were designed with attempts to control for attractiveness, expressiveness, role-playing ability, and verbal content.
Overall perceivers rated altruists as more “helpful” than non-altruists.
In a second experiment manipulating the payoffs for cooperation, perceivers (blind with respect to payoff condition and altruism level) assessed altruists who were helping others as more “concerned” and “attentive” than non-altruists.
However perceivers assessed the same altruists as less “concerned” and “attentive” than non-altruists when the payoffs were for self.
This finding suggests that perceivers are sensitive to nonverbal indicators of selfishness.
Indeed the self-reported non-altruists were more likely than selfreported altruists to retain resources for themselves in an objective measure of cooperative tendencies (i.e.
a dictator game).
In a third study altruists and nonaltruists’ facial expressions were analyzed.
The smile emerged as a consistent cue to altruism.
In addition, altruists exhibited more expressions that are under involuntary control (e.g., orbicularis oculi) compared to non-altruists.
Findings suggest that likelihood to cooperate is signaled nonverbally and the putative cues may be under involuntary control as predicted by Frank (1988).
Altruism is difficult to explain evolutionarily if subtle cheaters exist in a population (Trivers, 1971).
A pathway to the evolutionary maintenance of cooperation is nonverbal altruist-detection.
One adaptive advantage of nonverbal altruist-detection is the formation of trustworthy division of labour partnerships (Frank, 1988).
Three studies were designed to test a fundamental assumption behind altruistic partner preference models.
In the first experiment perceivers (blind with respect to target altruism level) made assessments of video-clips depicting self-reported altruists and self-reported non-altruists.
Video-clips were designed with attempts to control for attractiveness, expressiveness, role-playing ability, and verbal content.
Overall perceivers rated altruists as more “helpful” than non-altruists.
In a second experiment manipulating the payoffs for cooperation, perceivers (blind with respect to payoff condition and altruism level) assessed altruists who were helping others as more “concerned” and “attentive” than non-altruists.
However perceivers assessed the same altruists as less “concerned” and “attentive” than non-altruists when the payoffs were for self.
This finding suggests that perceivers are sensitive to nonverbal indicators of selfishness.
Indeed the self-reported non-altruists were more likely than selfreported altruists to retain resources for themselves in an objective measure of cooperative tendencies (i.e.
a dictator game).
In a third study altruists and nonaltruists’ facial expressions were analyzed.
The smile emerged as a consistent cue to altruism.
In addition, altruists exhibited more expressions that are under involuntary control (e.g., orbicularis oculi) compared to non-altruists.
Findings suggest that likelihood to cooperate is signaled nonverbally and the putative cues may be under involuntary control as predicted by Frank (1988).
-
Publié par
-
Publié le
01 janvier 2003
-
Licence :
Paternité, pas d'utilisation commerciale, partage des conditions initiales à l'identique -
Langue
English