Review of White's LOGIC AND ONTOLOGY IN HEIDEGGER

David A. White, Logic and Ontology in Heidegger Columbus (Ohio): Ohio State U.P., 1985. Pp. 245. Hardbound. Review by Lorenzo Peña ••• Copyright © by Lorenzo Peña 1992-05-15 ••• That logic and ontology have something or other in common is widely, if not unanimously, admitted. But what? Many people have maintained that logic is formal and does not concern itself with content, so a logical theory can entail no ontological commitment then no subject matter would be common to both logic and ontology, but logic would be the unavoidable framework outside or without which no ontology could be set up, articulated or put forward. Such is the formalistic view of logic. Other conflicting views have also been held, of course. Frege, Russell, Ferdinand Gonseth came close to identifying logic with ontology. (Husserl’s conception of logic as both formal ontology and formal apophantics lies somewhere in between.) The author of the book under review, D.A. White, seems to take the formalistic view for granted. That is going to constitute one of his major grounds for challenging Heidegger’s attempts to base logic upon an elucidation of Being. Another, still firmer assumption of D. A. White’s approach is that there is only one logic, which is logic. Thus no forays are made by the author into an assessment of Heidegger’s explorations from the standpoint of the existence of several, mutually discrepant, systems of logic. And yet that approach might well turn out to be most fruitful.