Mögliche-Welten-Semantik für indikative und kontrafaktische Konditionale? Eine formal-philosophisch Untersuchung der Chellas-Segerberg Semantik [Elektronische Ressource] / Matthias Unterhuber. Gutachter: Gerhard Schurz ; Manuel Bremer

PossibleWorldsSemanticsforIndicativeandCounterfactualConditionals?AFormal-PhilosophicalInquiryintoChellas-SegerbergSemanticsInaugural-DissertationzurErlangungdesDoktorgradesderPhilosophie(Dr. phil.)durchdiePhilosophischeFakultätderHeinrich-Heine-UniversitätDüsseldorfvorgelegtvonMatthiasUnterhuberausSchnaitseeBetreuer:Prof. Dr. GerhardSchurzDüsseldorfDezember2010D61TagderPrüfung: 9.3.2011Gutachter: Prof. Dr. GerhardSchurz&Prof. Dr. ManuelBremer(apl. Professor)iiiAbstractConditional logic is a sub-discipline of philosophical logic. It aims to provideanalternativeaccountofconditionalsincontrasttothetraditionalmaterialimpli-cation analysis. The present thesis focuses on a specific possible worlds seman-tics for conditional logics, the Chellas-Segerberg (CS) semantics (Chellas, 1975;Segerberg, 1989), which has not been widely investigated, save by Nejdl (1992)andDelgrande(1987,1988).ThemainthesisofthisdissertationisthatCS-semanticsisanadequateframeworkfor both (i) indicative and (ii) counterfactual conditionals. To argue for (i) and(ii)we, first,discussthegeneralneedofaconditionallogicapproach,whichgoesbeyondamaterialimplicationanalysis. Weaddressthedifferencebetweenindica-tive and counterfactual conditionals. We focus, then, on two arguments broughtforward by Bennett (2003) against accounts of indicative conditionals in termsof truth and falsehood, which arguably include possible worlds semantics suchas CS-semantics: (a) D.