Essays on incongruent preferences for effort allocations in multi-task agency relations [Elektronische Ressource] / von Veikko Thiele

Essays on Incongruent Preferences for EffortAllocations in Multi-Task Agency RelationsDISSERTATIONzur Erlangung des akademischen Gradesdoctor rerum politicarum(Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaft)eingereicht an derWirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultätder Humboldt-Universität zu BerlinvonDipl.-Kfm. Veikko Thielegeboren am 27.09.1977 in BerlinPräsident der Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin:Prof. Dr. Christoph MarkschiesDekan der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät:Prof. Oliver Günther, Ph.D.Gutachter:1. Prof. Dominique Demougin, Ph.D.2. Prof. Dr. Dorothea KüblerTag des Kolloquiums: 30. Juni 2006AbstractThis thesis comprises three self-contained essays that deal with inefficient effortallocations in multi-task agency relations with moral hazard.The first essay analyzes a multi-task agency framework where the agent exhibitstask-specific abilities. Besides investigating the appendant consequences of applyingincongruent performance measures in incentive contracts, this essay demonstratesthattheprovisionofincentives—includingtheoptimalaggregationofinformation—takes the agent’s task-specific abilities into consideration. It further emphasizesthe relation between job characteristics and the principal’s preference for selectingspecific agents.