Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance [Elektronische Ressource] / von Anja Schoettner

Essays on Incentive Contracts under Moral Hazardand Non-Veri able PerformanceDISSERTATIONzur Erlangung des akademischen Gradesdoctor rerum politicarum(Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaft)eingereicht an derWirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultatder Humboldt-Universitat zu BerlinvonFrau Dipl.-Wirt.-Math. Anja Schottnergeboren am 11.11.1977 in AscherslebenPrasident der Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin: Prof. Dr. Jurgen MlynekDekan der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultat:Prof. Dr. Joachim SchwalbachGutachter:1. Prof. Dominique Demougin, Ph.D.2. Prof. Dr. Oliver FabelTag des Kolloquiums: 10. Juni 2005AbstractThis thesis consists of four self-contained essays that compare real-world incentiveschemes used to mitigate moral hazard problems under non-veriable performance.TherstessaycontraststheimpactoftheprecisionofperformancemeasurementonwagecostsinU-andJ-typetournaments. InU-typetournamentsprizesarexed.In J-type tournaments only an overall wage sum is specied. The principal prefersa U-type tournament if workers receive a rent under limited liability and the costsof increasing precision are low. However, if workers are inequity-averse and haveunlimited liability, the J-type tournament leads to lower wage costs.Thesecondessayanalyzesoptimaljobdesignwhenthereis onlyone contractibleand imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to rm valueis non-veriable.