Essays on accounting disclosure and the use of stock price in incentive contracts [Elektronische Ressource] / Mirko S. Heinle

Mirko S. HeinleESSAYS ONACCOUNTING DISCLOSURE AND THE USE OF STOCK PRICE IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTSMirko S. HeinleESSAYS ONACCOUNTING DISCLOSURE AND THE USE OF STOCK PRICE IN INCENTIVE CONTRACTSInauguraldissertation zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften der Universität MannheimIDekan: Prof. Dr. Hans H. BauerReferent: Prof. Dr. Christian HofmannKorreferent: Prof. Dr. Dirk SimonsTag der muendlichen Pruefung: 28. Oktober 2009TABLE OF CONTENTSTable of Contents IIList of Figures IIIList of Tables IVAcknowledgments VIntroduction 1Essay 1: Soft Information and the Stewardship Value of Accounting Disclosure 7Essay 2: Transient Institutional Investors, Incentives,and Disclosure 48Essay 3: The Use of Price and Accounting Informationin Compensation Contracts 79Conclusion 107CV 111IILIST OF FIGURESFigure 1.1: Value of a Publicly Reported Contractible PerformanceMeasure y Given the Disclosure of Two Non-contractiblec Performance Measures Under η 372Figure 2.1: Timeline 54Figure 2.2: Value of Disclosing Report y andReport’s Sensitivity to the Agent’s Action 70Figure 2.3:y and Productivity 71IIILIST OF TABLESTable 1.1: Disclosure of a Single Performance Measure 21Table 1.2: Two-task Agency Conflict 28Table 1.3: Market Price and Price Sensitivity Under η and η 301 2Table 1.4: Agency Conflict with Price and one Contractible Measure 35Table 3.