Computing the cheapest winning coalition in a multi agent game

Niveau: Supérieur, Master
Computing the cheapest winning coalition in a multi-agent game Loıs Vanhee Supervisors: Sophie Pinchinat Scott Sanner Sylvie Thiebaux 2010 Université de Rennes 1, Research unit: IRISA, Team: S4 Australian National University, Research unit: NICTA, Team: SMLG IFSIC Research Master's degree in Computer Science ENS Cachan, antenne de Bretagne du m as -0 05 30 79 0, v er sio n 1 - 2 9 O ct 2 01 0

• design can


• agent


• lower cost winning


• turn-based games


• maximal losing


• coalition


• mechanism design


• can help


• losing coalitions