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21
pages
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English
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Documents
Description
Niveau: Supérieur, Bac+5
Rekeyed Digital Signature Schemes: Damage-containment in the face of key exposure Michel Abdalla? Mihir Bellare† July 2001 Abstract Motivated by the problem of delegating signing keys to vulnerable mobile devices, we de- fine rekeyed digital signature schemes. We provide an adversary model and a strong notion of security for such schemes, and show that the classic self-certification paradigm, properly imple- mented, provably meets this notion of security. We then suggest altnerative solutions, based on identification schemes, and having certain performance benefits compared to self-certification. Keywords: Digital signatures, key exposure, delegation, forward security, identification schemes, proofs of security. ?Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093, USA. E-Mail: . URL: Supported by CAPES under Grant BEX3019/95-2. †Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA. E-mail: . URL: Supported in part by a 1996 Packard Foundation Fellowship in Science and Engineering. 1
Rekeyed Digital Signature Schemes: Damage-containment in the face of key exposure Michel Abdalla? Mihir Bellare† July 2001 Abstract Motivated by the problem of delegating signing keys to vulnerable mobile devices, we de- fine rekeyed digital signature schemes. We provide an adversary model and a strong notion of security for such schemes, and show that the classic self-certification paradigm, properly imple- mented, provably meets this notion of security. We then suggest altnerative solutions, based on identification schemes, and having certain performance benefits compared to self-certification. Keywords: Digital signatures, key exposure, delegation, forward security, identification schemes, proofs of security. ?Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, California 92093, USA. E-Mail: . URL: Supported by CAPES under Grant BEX3019/95-2. †Dept. of Computer Science & Engineering, University of California at San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093, USA. E-mail: . URL: Supported in part by a 1996 Packard Foundation Fellowship in Science and Engineering. 1
- session key
- input pk
- digital signature
- secret key
- primary public
- rekeyed encryption
- ong-schnorr scheme
- public key
- associated secret
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Publié par
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Langue
English